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This dissertation analyses the main environmental problems that were faced during the 
armed conflict in Mozambique between 1977 to 1992. 
The subject matter covered by this dissertation is diverse, including the political economy 
of the Region South of the Save River, the character of armed conflict and the 
environmental profile on the effects of the conflict in Southern Mozambique. Because 
when South African regime backed Resistencia Nacional M09ambicana (RENAMO) in 
the early 1980s, the conflict had escalated in Southern Mozambique, and accelerated 
environmental problems, combined with natural disasters such as floods and droughts. 
The introductory section also examines how the region was transformed into the place of 
military operation both FRELIMO (Frente de Liberta9ao de M09ambique) and 
RENAMO, because up to 4 October 1992 South of Mozambique faced a devastating 
military conflict. The signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome had triggered an 
immediate invitation from government of Mozambique to the United Nations to 
undertake a comprehensive peacekeeping operation that would guide the country from 
conflict to democracy and peaceful elections. 
The second section, devoted to the political economy of the Save River, years after 
independence until the signature of the General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992. It 
discusses the economic and social implications when South African government ordered 
the repatriation of Mozambicans employed on South African mines and farms in 1986. 
The section also includes peasants, cooperatives and state farms in southern Mozambique 
in the 1980s. It analyses the interaction between FRELIMO's project of socialist 
transformation, through the development of agricultural cooperatives and state farms. The 











Finally the dissertation looks at the interaction between the anned conflict and the 
environment and the environmental profile on the effects of conflict in Southern 
Mozambique. Therefore, the section analyses conflict, displaced person, environmental 
problems in the coastal zones, deforestation, soil degradation, soil erosion, the impact of 
the war on wildlife and wildlife reserves and its interaction with natural disasters and 
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This dissertation analyses the environmental impact of the armed conflict in Southern 
Mozambique in general, and in the valleys, wildlife reserves, urban, peri-urban and in the 
coastline zones of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces in particular, from 1977 to 
1992. During this time, the armed conflict played a central role in the transformation of 
both economic, social and environmental impact ofthe Region South of Mozambique. 
All sections of the dissertation, which cover the beginning of conflict until its end in 
1992, provide an overview of the political economy, social and the environmental impact 
of the armed conflict in the three southern provinces of Mozambique, and examine why 
and how the region was transformed into RENAMO's preference to intensify the war 
against FRELIMO's Government. Finally the dissertation looks at the impact of these 
constraints of the armed conflict on the environment in whole southern Mozambique, and 
the causes and the effects of this political tension. 
When Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975, the new government 
immediately faced enemies on its borders. The new Government's strong opposition to 
white minority rule in both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa provoked fierce hostility 
from both the regimes.1 In 1976, Mozambique closed its transport links to land-locked 
Southern Rhodesia, in support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. At its III Congress 
in 1977 FRELIMO declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The Government 
subsequently signed aid agreements with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and Cuba.2 
IJudith Maureen Marshall, War. debt and structural adjustment in Mozambique: The social 
impact, Ottawa 1992, p.1. 
2William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique, London 1992, p.112; 












RENAMO grew rapidly in size and in military effectiveness, which enable it to destroy 
the social and economic infrastructure through wide areas of the country. Between 1980 
and 1982, RENAMO's strength increased from less than 1,000 to estimated 8,000 
fighters, and its operations spread from central provinces of Manica and Sofala into 
Southern provinces of Gaza and Inhamabane; and in1985/6 RENAMO occupied some 
zones of the Maputo province. By 1987 the war had spread to every district of the three 
southern Mozambique provinces (Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane), severely crippling the 
region's economy and displacing overlOO,OOO people from their home3 
The disruption of peasant and state farms caused by the conflict, compounded by severe 
drought and flood conditions throughout most of this period (1977 -1980s), soon created 
widespread food shortages affecting a further 200-300,000 people. For example, the 
droughts of 1981-1983 provoked migrants moving through the districts of Matutuine and 
Namaacha.4 This fact could be identified in two waves of out migration. The first was a 
relatively small movement provoked by drought and second was a full scale exodus 
accompanying of the armed conflict. Rural-urban migrations had sky-rocketed, as people 
continued to flee the countryside in search of some measure of security in the cities and 
in coastline zones, greatly straining already overburdened urban and other infrastructures. 
These situations had provoked several environmental problems because of the excessive 
number of displaced popUlations. Thus the main environmental threats were almost 
exclusively located along the coastal littoral, peri-urban and urban areas of southern 
Mozambique. The population fleeing the fighting in interior and, also looking for safe 
places because of the floods and droughts had concentrated along the coastal, peri-urban 
and urban areas, and the environmental pressure in these areas were becoming severe. 
3Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique, pp.9-1O; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Landmines 
in Mozambique, New York 1992, p.6 
40tto Roesch, Renamo and Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: A View from Gaza Province: 
paper prepared for symposium "Mozambique:" Contemporary Issues and Current Research, 
organized by the Refugee Studies Programme and the Standing Committee for Africa Studies, 











Thus half the population had been affected through massive civilian losses, malnutrition, 
displacement and migration, and no reasonable environmental management strategy was 
initiated under these circumstances. Therefore, in some places, where the displaced 
persons lived faced environmental problems because a major part of the villages were 
built on a swamp. This situation was found in Maputo (Mafalala and Luis Cabral), and 
Gaza (Xai-Xai, Macia-Bilene and Chokwe). The governmental was being denied access 
to the hinterland. Primary health and educational services gradually ground to be a halt in 
the rural area. 
Southern Mozambique consists of large expenses of semi-arid grasslands, cut by 
occasional forest reserves and by fertile river valleys and swamplands which can be 
drained for irrigation. Large state farms producing food crops for the urban market and 
citrus and sugar for export were concentrated in the valleys, as were a wide range of 
capitalist enterprises, from Lonrho to small capitalist farms and state farms like Limpopo 
Agro-Industrial Complex (CAIL).5 Peasant cultivation dominated in the dry land areas, 
and many families maintained substantial herds of livestock, goats, cattle and pigs, the 
latter particularly in the Inhambane province. 
Just as the position of Mozambican migrants in the South African labour market was 
sharply differentiated, so also was their relationship to agricultural production in 
Southern Mozambique. Moreover, the ways in which a migrant's salary was used varied 
from region to region, in relation to different farming conditions. In Homoine, Inhambane 
province, for example, miners who returned home as prosperous men invested mainly in 
the construction of cement houses and water tanks. And in the districts of Magude, 
Moamba and Namaacha in Maputo province, however, returning migrants put their 
savings into cattle and had few permanent crops.6 
Nevertheless, there was no single homogeneous Mozambican peasantry, but rather 
different strata of peasants and work-peasants who organized their farming in quite 
5Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa: The impact 











different ways. Some had irrigable land and others only rain fed farms. Some had cattle 
and oxen for ploughing, others had goats or pigs, and others had no livestock at all. Some 
own ploughs and others had only hoes. Nevertheless, this rain fed production had been 
decimated in many areas by years of natural disasters, such as drought and floods, and by 
armed conflict. However, in southern Mozambique the armed conflict generally affected 
the popUlations later (mid-1980s then CentrelNorth.7 
During this period of armed conflict atrocities were carried out against the civilian 
population by both sides in the conflict. Inland areas, much of the popUlation lived as 
displaced persons or refugee, however, there was very different according to people were 
refugees in neighbouring countries, as for example to South Africa and Swaziland, and 
whether they lived in camps or in the local communities. The conflict not only displaced 
100,000 of Mozambicans in southern Mozambique to ecologically sensitive areas in 
neighbouring countries and along that country's fragile coast, from 1980s to 1990s, but 
also exerted excessive pressure on the environment, decimating wildlife parks and 
reserves, causing widespread and disrupting environmental management. Therefore, 
during the armed conflict, the rural population was the principal victim, and to a lesser 
extent of environmental hazards.8 
Thus this conflict provoked the assimilation of new behaviours and attitudes in relation to 
natural resources and caused weak cohesion and solidarity among people. These people 
found themselves in situations of extreme poverty. This situation obliged them, to 
survive, to collect out from the nature all what could be immediately marketer used. They 
cut mangroves in the coastal zones and other protected trees for woodfuel or charcoal 
production. However, at the time, most woodfuel came not only from cutting trees for 
fuel, but from surplus wood left over from clearing land for agriculture, or from lopping 
branches of trees standing on farms that were valued for many other purposes besides 
6Ibid., p.16 
7Martin Whiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at Village Level-Mozambique: 











fuel supply (e.g. shade, fruit, or building poles). Therefore, the environmental functions 
and services of the forest ecosystem were reduced or lost, depending on the extent of 
deforestation. During the war, deforestation increased soil erosion, especially in coastal 
zones where the high concentration of people living within 50 kilometres of the coastal, 
increased the real population density. 
The urban population, however, bore the burden of population inflows to escape the 
armed conflict and of structural adjustment which could create enormous difficulties such 
as food, water or fuel since the volume of basic commodities and the value of earnings 
had both declined. Over three million people in rural areas suffered from food shortages 
either because of displacement or because armed conflict had affected rural production 
systems. Therefore, the key environmental problem that had to be tackled was the 
displacement of rural population zones where the essential resources, secure land, was in 
scare supply and where a reduction in wage-earning opportunity had reduced the capacity 
to purchase farming inputs. Sustainable land use strategies had to be devised in a context 
of intense population concentration and resource scarcity. However, these problems 
influenced the major concerns in the contemporary environment and development 
debates in Mozambique, including deforestation, range land degradation, soil erosion and 
the depletion of wildlife biodiversity. 
8Ibid., p.lO; LCherrett et ai., Norwegian Aid and Environment in Mozambique: The Issues, 
Bergen, December 1990, p.46, and Phil O'Keefe, Mozambique environmental Problems: myths 












The Political Economy of the Region South of the Save River 
The South Region of the Save River is an area which reflects the convergence of two 
economic forces: agriculture, temporary migration to the Mozambican cities of Xai-Xai, 
Inhambane and Maputo, and to the gold mines and plantations (Farms) of South Africa. 
But when the armed conflict affected the region in the 1980s, the political economy of the 
region changed. 
Migrant Labour Situation 
Up to the time of Independence, the system of migratory labour was relatively stable. The 
standard path for a young man who wished to marry and to establish his own family was 
to sign on for the mines. He worked for a varying number of contracts and only returned 
definitively to the countryside when the income from family production could provide an 
alternative to the salary from the mines.9 The number of contracts worked depended, 
therefore, on differences in the strength of family production as well as on the presence of 
alternative wage-employment in Mozambique. In cases of natural disasters and illness, or 
when the family needed to finance major expenses such as the purchase of oxen, the 
peasant once again became a proletarian and returned to the mines. 10 
Since Independence, migratory labour to South Africa was most deeply rooted in the 
three southern provinces of Mozambique where the dominant form of capitalist 
penetration was the exploitation of Mozambican workers on the South African mines. 
This form of exploitation transformed the men of the countryside into a semi-proletariat, 
moving between the mines, where they spent a good part of their life, and village, where 
the family maintained a small plot under cultivation. ll Although Southern Mozambique 
had been eclipsed since independence as the predominant source of mining labour for 
South Africa, the unexpected repatriation order of 1986 dealt a heavy blow to the 
9Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa. pA. 
lOIbid., pA. 











Mozambican economy as a whole and to the wage-dependent families of Southern 
Mozambique in particular.12 
The years after independence South Africa started to layoff Mozambican workers and 
the cash flows from the Rand earnings began to dry up. In 1975 113,488 Mozambicans 
had been officially recruited by the South Africa. 13 For 1977 only 30,000 Mozambicans 
were wanted for fourteen specified mines, and only men holding "bonus cards" (Re-
employment and Early Return Bonus Certificates) could be taken on. Bonus cards had 
been introduced as a means of encouraging Mozambicans to accept recruitment again as 
soon as they had home for the required minimum of eight months. The card entitled a 
man to return to the same job on the same mine at the same rate of pay. Originally 
intended to encourage migration to the mines, bonus cards later served to stop men from 
coming. 14 
In the 1980s, migrant labour from Mozambique was defined by Pretoria as an important 
economic target to hit, because the political relations between Mozambique and South 
Africa were not good. The South African regime knew that a reduction in migrancy 
would have a serious economic and social impact on thousands of rural families in 
southern Mozambique who had depended on regular incomes from migrancy for almost a 
century. IS 
However, when Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord in 1984 it 
was intended by Samora Machel's government and Pretoria to herald a new era of 
cooperation between the countries and Mozambique'S government was expected to lead 
to the defeat ofRENAMO. Part of the dialogue after the signing of the Nkomati Accord 
centered on migrant labour, and Mozambique expected to increase its quota of migrants. 
12Ib'd ... 3 1 ., pp.l1l- . 
13Malyn Newitti, A History of Mozambique, London 1995, p.551. 
14Simon E. Katzenellenbogen, South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways and 
Trade in the Making ofa Relationship, Manchester University Press 1982, pp.154- 155. 
15Luis Ant6nio Covane, Migrant Labour and Agriculture in Southern Mozambique: with special 
reference to the Lower Limpopo valley, 1920-1992. PhD Thesis. Institute of Commonwealth, 











Despite the Nkomati Accord, political relations between Mozambique and South Africa 
continued to be very delicately balanced. The political divergence between the two states 
was used to threaten economic relations. Indeed, the South Africans continued to put 
economic pressure on the FRELIMO government in addition to providing military 
support to RENAMO. 16 
Thus, in October 1986 the South African government ordered the repatriation of 61,500 
Mozambicans employed on South African mines and farms following a land mine 
explosion which injured six white South African soldiers patrolling the border with 
Mozambique. They were to be repatriated when their contracts expired.17 Employers 
were not consulted by the government and they were faced with having to phase out their 
Mozambican workforce over a period of eighteen months. 18 Therefore, using alleged 
ANC activities as a pretext, South Africa announced the repatriation of all legally 
employed Mozambicans. However, after pressure from the mining industry which was 
dependent on skilled Mozambican labour and farmers of the eastern Transvaal who relied 
on cheap Mozambican workers, the expulsion order was amended so that effectively only 
unskilled miners would be immediately affected.19 
At the time the apartheid regime announced its ban, claimed that was acting in retaliation 
against the KaNgwane landmine incident of October 6th• Pretoria alleged that was carried 
out by ANC members based in Maputo with the support of members of Mozambican 
security forces.2o It had become apparent, in the light of subsequent tragic developments, 
that the KaNgwane incident was no more than a convenient pretext. The banning of 
migrant labour was, in fact, part of a broader strategy of destabilization intended to 
16Covane, Migrant Labour and Agriculture in Southern Mozambique,p.306. 
17Colin Darch, A Guerra e as mudanyas sociais recentes em Moyambique 0986-1992): cemirios 
para 0 futuro. Trabalho apresentado ao II Congresso Luso-Afro-Brasileiro de Ciencias Sociais: in 
Cadernos Candido Mendes, Estudos Afro-Asiaticos, No.23-Dezembro 1992, Sao Paulo, 4-7 de 
Agosto de 1992, p.218. 
18Covane, Migrant Labour and Agriculture in Southern Mozambique, p.306. 
19Fion de Vletter, "Foreign labour on the South African gold mines: New insights on an old 











increase pressure against Mozambique in the hope of bringing about major political 
change in the country?' 
The impact of the expulsion of Mozambican migrant workers from South Africa posed 
three immediate and immense problems; not only for the migrants and their families, but 
for the entire Mozambican economy: unemployment, the reduction of goods and services 
in local trade circuits; and a sharp loss in foreign exchange earnings.22 
The tactic was only one of a series of crippling and destabilizing initiatives directed 
against Mozambique. This measure, decided unilaterally by the apartheid regime, was not 
initially communicated either to the Mozambican government or to the various South 
African enterprises affected by it. Instead, it was announced in a joint declaration by no 
less than four senior ministers of the regime-Foreign Office Minister, Work Minister, 
Mineral Resources Minister and Home Office Minister. According to this declaration, 
further recruitment of Mozambicans would be prohibited and those working in the 
country at that time would be dismissed and deported from the country as soon as their 
contracts expired.23 
As above mentioned , the October announcement led to intense lobbying by 
organizations representing capital employing Mozambican migrant workers-the Chamber 
of Mines and Lowveld farmers in particular. These were anxious at least to minimize the 
potential disruptive impact on production of having to replace at short notice the many 
thousands of Mozambican workers in their employ-a significant number of whom were 
both skilled and experienced. In negotiations between the representatives of these 
organizations and officials of the regime during November 1986, the employers sought 
2°Intemational Migration for Employment: Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa: The 
impact of the expUlsion order, Maputo 1987, p.10; and Darch, A Guerra e as mudancas sociais 
recentes em Mo<;ambigue (1986-1992), p.218. 
21rntemational Migration for Employment, p.10. 
22Darch, A Guerra e as mudancas sociais recentes em Moyambigue (1986-1992), p.218; and 
International Migration for Employment, p.ll. 
23Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa, p.1;and 











permission to retain for a longer period the servIces of long-serving and skilled 
Mozambican workers?4 
The peasant economy of the southern provinces, subjected to the migrant labour system 
during at least four generations, became gradually so dependent on agricultural inputs 
and wage-goods acquired with the salary from the mines that it lost its capacity to survive 
without exporting migrant workers.25 
Confronting unemployment, about 65,000 families comprising 325,000 people were 
directly affected by the return of migrant workers in 1987. Within five years, 100,000 
families had been to reintegrate migrant workers. In a deeper sense, however, the crisis of 
unemployment represented by the decline of Mozambican mine labour affected almost all 
rural families in the three southern provinces. The total ban on the recruitment of novices, 
which only sharpened the general tendency already clear since independence, meant that 
all those young men who in the past would begun their working lives on the mines, they 
found alternative forms ofwage-employment.26 
In confronting the question of unemployment, there was therefore distinguish sharply 
between different groups of migrants with quite different work-experience, qualifications 
and economic resources: 
i) men of 30 and 40 years who had worked from 3 to 10 contracts and who held 
positions of responsibility within the black labour force. They earned well, 
relative to the salaries of black workers in South Africa, and very well 
compared to other Mozambican migrant workers. These men returned 
regularly to Mozambique, but for very brief periods. They were migrants only 
in the sense that their families continued to live in Mozambique and that they 
were classified as foreign workers under South African labour law. They were 
not affected by the expulsion order, because they were skilled minersP 
24Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa, p.l. 
25Ibid., p.3. 
26Ibid.,p.l1. 











ii) less skilled workers, without job security, who made up around 45 per cent of 
the Mozambican labour force on the mines. Less was known about this group 
because its labour profile was not publicized by the Chamber of Mines.28 The 
expulsion order was immediately hit this more poorly paid group and, 
possibly, skilled miners employed by the independent mines not linked to the 
Chamber of Mines. This group was generally younger, less experienced and 
with fewer investment funds than the first group; 
iii) beside these two groups of miners, there existed the vast majority of 
Mozambican migrants: poorly paid, working in the farms or other 
unregistered jobs, often young, unskilled and subject to brutal exploitation and 
political blackmail. This was the sector that was most immediately affected by 
the expulsion.29 
In considering how to reintegrate those affected by the expUlsion order into production in 
Mozambique, whether in industry or in agriculture, one could take into account the 
different position and resources which each group had. The first group, experienced 
miners, had considerable skills and savings, and many of them had had already made a 
substantial investment in agricultural production. Their return was gradual and their 
integration into their home communities relatively smooth. Others were absorbed by 
industrial or even artisanal employment. For the vast majority of those in the last three 
groups, however, no integration was possible without the creation of more-wage-Iabour 
positions in industry or of new forms 01 agricultural production.3o 
However, though levels of labour recruitment to South Africa had declined, men 
continued to look for legal or illegal migrant work in South Africa as the preferred way of 
meeting long-term household monetary needs and also, because there were no real 
economic alternatives in Mozambique. 
28Ibid., p.ll. 











In short, five years after October 1986, the major part of the current Mozambican mine 
labour force had returned home permanently. A small number might continue to be 
employed longer, but within a decade their numbers would be negligible. It was expected 
that the forced repatriation of many clandestine workers, in agriculture and elsewhere, 
would continue apace. This massive return of the migrant workers implied that the 
economy of the three southern provinces of Mozambique ( Inhambane, Gaza, and 
Maputo), historically shaped as a labour reserve for South Africa, faced a radical 
restructuring.31 
List of Districts and Provinces of Origin of Miners 
GAZA INHAMBANE MAPUTO 
Xai-Xai Massinga Maputo City 
Chokwe Inhambane I Manhiya 
Chibuto Morrumbene Magude 
Manjacaze Zavala Matola 
B ilenelMacia Homoine 
Chicualacuala 
Source: FlOn de Vletter, Sons of Mozamb1que: Mozamb1can Mmers and post-aparthe1d South Afr1ca, Cape 
Town 1998, p.16. 
All miners were/are recruited from the southern provinces of Mozambique, even though 
recruitment has now been opened up to other provinces. Gaza has traditionally been the 
main supply province and districts such as Chokwe, Chibuto, Chicualacuala, Manjacaze 
and Xai-Xai have been the principal source districts. 32 
30Ibid.,p.12 . 
31 International Migration for Employment, p.2. 
32Pion de Vletter, Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican Miners and post-apartheid South Africa, 
Cape Town 1998,pp.15-16; De Vletter, International Migration for Employment: worker paper, 











Peasants, Cooperatives and State Farms. 
Southern Mozambique consists of large expanses of semi-arid grasslands, cut by 
occasional forest reserves and by fertile river valleys and swamplands which can be 
drained for irrigation. Large State farms producing food crops for the urban market and 
citrus and sugar for export were concentrated in the valleys, as were a wide range of 
capitalist enterprises, from Lonhro to small capitalist farms.33 Peasant cultivation 
dominated in the dry land areas, and many families maintained substantial herds of 
livestock, goats, cattle and pigs, the latter particularly in the Inhambane province. This 
rain fed production had been decimated in many areas by years of drought and of armed 
conflict. There were, however, also many family producers with a plot of irrigable land. 
Their number increased as did that of capitalist farms when some land from the State-
sector was redistributed as of 1984.34 
There was no single homogeneous Mozambican peasantry, but rather different strata of 
peasants and worker-peasants who organized their farming in quite different ways. Some 
had irrigable land and others only rain fed farms. Some had cattle and oxen for 
ploughing, others had goats or pigs, and others had no livestock at all. Some own ploughs 
and others had only hoes. Some hired non-family labour to work in their fields while 
others hired themselves out to neighbours on a casual basis. There were some who 
regularly market agricultural surpluses but many others whose family production was not 
even sufficient to cover the basic food needs of the family.35 
The forms of differentiation of the peasantry in southern Mozambique were 
interdependent with the process of proletarianization. For some, wage work was the way 
in which they accumulated an investment fund to initiate irrigated farming. For others, it 
was the only way in which they managed to buy basic goods, including food, needed for 














the everyday subsistence of the family. At the same time as the irrigated lands of the 
south became an important source of marketed produce, there grew a significant demand 
for purchased food on the part of families residing in the countryside and cultivating 
small plots but yet incapable of producing enough for their own subsistence.36 The depth 
of proletarianization and the corresponding process of differentiation in the southern 
provinces was clear in data on economically active men drawn from the 1980 census. 
Among those who maintained their official residence in the countryside, the percentage 
of wage workers was as follows: Inhamabne 20 per cent, Gaza 42 per cent, and Maputo, 
excluding the city of Maputo, 60 per cent.37 Although the percentage of wage-labourers 
was relatively low in among men residing in Inhambane, sex-ratios and the registry of 
foreign residence indicated that the process of proletarianisation was deeply embedded in 
Inhambane. There, as in Gaza, many migrants cut residential ties to their home 
province.38 
Substantial differentiation of family production in Inhambane was reflected both in 
polygamous and single-women headed households. In determining how each of the 
different groups of migrants could be reintegrated in agricultural production, it might 
therefore look at three sharply different modes of farm-organization: 
i) Rich peasants or small capitalist farmers; they organized their agricultural and 
livestock production principally for the market, and their scale of production 
depended on the regular use of a wage-labour force. They had at least 5 
hectares of irrigated land, they used tractors or animal traction for ploughing 
and they often had large herds of livestock; 
ii) Poor peasantry; the poor peasantry was principally composed of women and 
some youths who could not live on the basis of their own family farms 
without some forms of supplementary wage-income. They depended almost 













irrigated land. They possessed neither ploughs nor oxen and they produced no 
agricultural surpluses for sale.39 
At least one member of the household was a migrant worker and others were agricultural 
day-labourers. Sometimes they burnt charcoal or made mats and baskets to increase 
family-income. Since they cultivated dry land, this stratum was especially vulnerable to 
drought. These families generally tried to become middle peasants, saving enough to 
invest in oxen and agricultural implements. Alternatively, they moved permanently to the 
city, abandoning their peasant base.4o 
It was thought, however, that the conditions of drought and war which ravaged the South 
of Mozambique after 1980, had led to greater emigration of young men and even boys 
from the rural areas to the cities and clandestinely to South Africa and Swaziland.41 Sex 
ratios were thus probably more imbalanced in the lower age-classes. iii) Middle peasants; 
their farms allowed them to live entirely on the basis of agricultural production. The 
investment fund for setting up such farms generally derived, however, from a period of 
migrant-labour rather than inheritance. Middle peasants organized their farms to feed the 
family and to produce regular marketed surpluses. They own oxen and ploughs and 
generally had at least 3 hectares for dry land cultivation and 1-2 hectares of valley or 
irrigable land. Most of the work was done by family members, but they rely on casual 
wage-labour or various forms of non-reciprocal work parties to resolve labour shortages 
during busy periods. Many supplemented their income from farming with craftwork.42 
The three strata of the peasantry were economically interdependent: the poor peasantry 
was a labour-reserve for the middle and rich peasantry. Rich peasants generally had a 
number of permanent workers, who themselves had their own small family plots, and 
they also recruit seasonal labour from poorer neighboring families. The middle peasantry 
38Intemational Migration for Employment, October 1987, p.14 
39Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africa, p.14. 
4°Ibid., p.14. 
41Intemational Migration for Employment, pp.14-15. 











also recruited people from poorer households, particularly women, to supplement their 
own family labour. They sometimes paid cash, but it was more common to pay in food or 
to lend oxen and a plough. There were often links of kinship between the families of the 
middle-peasantry and the women who helped out in their fields. 43 
Differentiation of the peasantry in southern Mozambique sharpened after independence. 
Some returning miners gained access to valley land abandoned by colonial farmers and 
used their higher salaries on the mines to expand private family-production in irrigated 
areas. Drought and the terror and destruction brought to many inland areas by the armed 
conflict ruined family production and thus opened up new reserves of cheap labour for 
small capitalist and rich peasant farmers. In a market characterized by great excess 
demanded for both consumer goods and means of production, farmers with substantial 
surpluses to market were often able to defend their position through direct barter, whereas 
subsistence producers found that their wage-income constantly bought less and less.44 
During the first two years after independence, peasants farmers established collective 
fields (Cooperatives) on a spontaneous basis throughout Mozambique as part of 
FRELIMO's strategy to transform agriculture. In the context of general nationalist 
euphoria that swept the country after independence, these efforts met a high degree of 
popular response. One of first concrete expressions of peasant willingness to experiment 
with collectivization took the form of machambas co[ectivas, or "collective 
fields"(sometimes also known as machambas do povo, "people's fields") which were ad 
hoc, loosely organized, community-based forms of collective agricultural production, 
which sprang up with minimal mobilizational effort throughout the country in the 
immediate pre-and post-independence period.45 The machambas colectivas established in 
the Baixo Limpopo, in Gaza, like those established elsewhere, enlisted widespread 
43Ibid., p.1S. 
«Centro de Estudos AfricanoslUEM, Mozambican Migrant Workers in South Africib p.16. 
45Roesch, Peasants and People's Power in Mozambique: The experience of the Baixo Limpopo, 











interest and considerable popular participation, and in nearly all cases served as 
precursors for agricultural cooperatives proper.46 
By 1980, only five years after independence, about 120 communal villages had been 
created housing approximately one third of the province's rural population, most of them 
in the densely populated, agriculturally important southern districts. The majority of these 
communal villages were created in the wake of the floods which devastated the Limpopo 
valley in early 1977, displacing hundreds of thousands of people whom the government 
was able to rapidly resettle into planned village communities on the high ground above 
the flood plain of the Limpopo and its tributaries.47 Few new villages were created after 
1980. The few that were created in the 1980s were either the products of government 
efforts to resettle severely drought-affected populations in the sparsely populated interior 
of the province, or the result of forced resettlement by the Mozambican armed forces in 
the wake of the escalation of RENAMO activities in the province. By 1987 the armed 
conflict had spread to every district of the province, severely crippling the province's 
economy and displacing over 100,000 people from their homes.48 
The disruption of peasant agricultural production caused by armed conflict, compounded 
by several drought conditions throughout most of this period, soon created widespread 
food shortages affecting a further 200-300,000 people. Rural-urban migration had sky-r 
ocketed, as people continued to flee the countryside in search of some measure of 
security in the cities, greatly straining already overburdened urban infrastructure.49 
State farms were being established at a rapid rate during this early period. The creation of 
state farms on the lands abandoned by departing colonial settlers was seen by the 
government as the fastest and most effective way of restoring the productive potential of 















especially Maputo. and as a rapid and effective way of initiating the socialization of 
peasant agriculture in the area. A state farm sector was also seen as a way of alleviating 
the growing problem of rural unemployment caused by the collapse of capitalist 
agriculture and the decline in migrant labour to South Africa.5o 
By the early 1980s the cooperative movement was in decline. Producer cooperatives that 
survived were almost entirely based in former settler farms, and they lost members over 
time. By 1982, only around 2 percent of the rural popUlation were cooperative members, 
and as the marginalized production units in FRELIMO's socialist development strategy, 
cooperatives received only 2 percent of the state's agricultural investment up to 1983.51 
Contrary to FRELIMO's plan, members did not pool their individual holdings, plows, 
draft animals, and other resources to work together. The only exceptions were in the 
cooperatives surrounding major cities (as for example, the Union of the Cooperatives of 
the Maputo Green Zone),52 where members' households had a diversified income base, 
and among some FRELIMO veterans of the liberation war, who did most of their farming 
together.53 
The most important part of state sector had 140,000 hectares ofland in 1982. FRELIMO 
divided the agricultural sector into four distinct parts: family farms, private farms, co· 
operatives and state farms. The sate farms were created partly from the abandoned estates 
of the Portuguese, and pre-empted any possibility that these would be distributed to 
peasant families or turned into co·operatives. Some state farms were former plantations, 
but others were formed by grouping the smallholdings of the colonatos into huge state· 
managed concerns.54 An example of the latter was the massive Complexo Agro·lndustrial 
5~oesch, Peasants and People's Power in Mozambique,p.14. 
51Kenneth Hermele, Mozambican Crossroads: Economics and P()Jitics in the Era of Structural 
Adjustment, Bergen, May 1990, p.24. 
52Ibid., p. 24. 
53L.Marle Bowen, The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggle in colonial and postcolonial 
Mozambique, University Presss of Virginia 2000, p.129. 
54Alpheus Manghezi, Ku Thekela: Estratc5gia de sobrevivencia contra a fome no SuI de 
Mocambique: in Estudos Mo£ambicanos, Vol. 4, Maputo 1983, p.22; and Kenneth Hermele, 











do Limpopo (CAlL), consisting of 16,000 hectares and including a rice-dehusking 
factory, a sausage and cheese factory and tomato and tobacco processing plants. To 
create CAlL, FRELIMO had to thwart the aspirations of many hundreds of peasant 
farmers who had hoped either to regain land lost to the original colonato or to acquire one 
of the irrigated farms as a probationer or a colono. 55 
The combination of an unmotivated work force, poor management, and a lack of 
technical skills and resources led to serious financial problems and a collapse in 
production by the early 198056,and in 1983/1984, CAlL was divided up into 10 new state 
farms such as, LONRHO/LOMACO, Empresa Sementes de Mo~ambique (SEMOC), 
Sistema do Regadio Eduardo Mondlane (SlREMO), Joiio Ferreira dos Santos (JFS), 
farms of Mapapa, Conhane, Massavasse, Hokwe, Chilembene, and Nwachicoluane. 
These farms took control of approximately 1,500 hectares each. The remaining area, 
some 10,000 hectares, were distributed to smallholders (family sector) and larger 
commercial farmers (private sector).57 
Limpopo 1950-1987, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1988, p.47; and Newitt, 
A History of Mozambique, p.553. 
55Manghezi, Ku Thekela: Estrategia de sobrevivencia contra a fome no SuI de Mocambique, 
pp.22; Hermele, Land Struggles and Social Differentiation in Southern Mozambique: A Case 
Study ofChokwe, Limpopo 1950-1987, p.47; and Newitt, A History of Mozambique, p.553. 
s6Ibid., pp.x-xi; 8-9. 
57Christopher Tanner et al., Land Disputes and Ecological Degradation in an Irrigation Scheme: A 
case study of State Farm Divestiture in Chokwe, Mozambique. A Report by the Land Tenure 
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The character of the armed conflict. 
Military characteristics 
From 1964, through its independence from Portugal in 1975, up until the present, 
Mozambique has enjoyed few prolonged periods of peace. In 1975, the government's 
opposition to minority rule in both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa provoked fierce 
hostility of the two regimes. 58 
In 1976, Mozambique closed its transport links to land-locked Southern Rhodesia, in 
support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. At its III Congress in 1977 FRELIMO 
declared its a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The Government subsequently signed aid 
agreements with both USSR and Cuba. 59 
The armed conflict against the Mozambican Government started in 1977 with the creation of 
RENAMO. It is now generally accepted by scholars that RENAMO was established by the 
Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), which wanted to sponsor an anti-
FRELIMO force within Mozambique. This force was originally meant to be a fifth 
column and its primary task was to spy on the Zimbabwean ZANU guerrillas inside 
Mozambique. Later on, this assignment was expanded to include armed opposition to 
FRELIMO's government as retaliation for its support for ZANLA (ZANU's military 
wing), and for closing of Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia.6o Even later still, in the 
1980s, South Africa's interest in sponsoring such a force was, first, to weaken 
FRELIMO's support for the ANC (African National Congress), then outlawed in South 
S8Marshall, War, debt and structural adjustment in Mozambique: The social impact, p.l. 
59Finnegan, A Complicated War, p.ll2; and Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique. p.9. 
60Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, London 1991, pp.I-16 and Alcinda M.R. 
Honwana, Spiritual Agency and self renewal in southern Mozambique. Thesis submitted for 











Africa, second to fight Marxism and last to increase economic dependence on South 
Africa.61 
When South Africa security forces took direct control over RENAMO's development in 
1980 it was just the continuation of an early collaboration with the Rhodesian secret 
police on matter. RENAMO's mentors kept the military wing separate from the political 
wing, which was almost completely controlled by white Portuguese-speaking 
Mozambicans, such as Orlando Cristina who was the secretary general of RENAMO, and 
Evo Fernandes its spokesperson in Europe.62 
FRELIMO's option for a Marxist ideology implied the establishment of a society + 
built upon a scientific and materialistic interpretation of nature and social reality and free 
from the values of the traditional and colonial societies.63 However, its opposition to 
traditional authority and religion had often been unsuccessful, and had created a 
considerable high degree of resentment among the peasantry. RENAMO quickly 
capitalized on this suppression of traditional and the consequent flowering of popular 
resentment, presenting itself as a movement against communism and against the 
disrespect for Mozambican traditions.64 
In fact, RENAMO had created alliances with the traditional authorities, regales, outlawed 
by FRELIMO for their role during colonialism, and other leaders or village elders who 
had been marginalized. Another important alliance was that with the traditional religious 
authorities such as diviners, healers, spirit mediums and prophets. These practitioners 
played a pivotal role in regulating daily life in RENAMO military bases. Major decisions, 
including the military ones, were often taken after consultation with spirits.65 
61Joao M. Cabrita,: The Tortuous Mozambique Road to Democracy, New York 2000, p.l08. 
62Ibid., p.108 
63Ibid., p.108. 
64 Honwana, Spiritual Agency and Self Renewal in Southern Mozambique, p.170. 











Over the years, RENAMO military operations was carried with raids on FRELIMO 
garrisons and ambushes on the main highway and other roads featuring high in 
RENAMO's communications. RENAMO developed a communications system that 
covered virtually the entire country. RENAMO headquarters was equipped with South 
African-made transceivers with frequency hopping capability, rendering the Mozambique 
Armed Forces (FAM) detection, location and jamming countermeasures unviable. From 
the mid-1980s onwards, RENAMO was able to monitor most ofFAM's communications 
networks. In Southern Mozambique, RENAMO's base at Ngungue, monitored Maputo, 
Inhambane and Gaza.66 
This played an important role in the forecast of government military offensive while in 
the planning stage. To success of thus role was to an extent due to information Rhodesia, 
and subsequently South Africa, obtained from their monitoring of Mozambique military 
communications, which was then passed on to RENAMO. 
The Hammanskraal and Phalaborwa listening posts in South Africa assumed great 
importance at height of the war. Although supplied with weapons from outside the 
country, RENAMO had nonetheless to depend even more on the rural popUlation for 
food, shelter, portage and information than would a movement that relied on safe havens 
outside the country where it operated. It also meant that RENAMO had to sustain on its 
own every military offensive mounted by government and allied forces, without having 
the possibility of retreating to friendly territory.67 
Until early 1982 RENAMO was operating in largely uninhabited areas which were so 
vast that it was extremely difficult for FRELIMO to pursue its forces. With South African 
supplies, they needed no contact with local people and could easily ambush traffic on 
remote roads and railway line. Bases were established in remote parts ofInhambane, as at 
Tome and Gaza at Hati-Hati, generally less than 320 kilometres from South Africa and 
66 Honwana Spiritual Agency and self Renewal in Southern Mozambique, p.170. 












thus within easy air-drop range.68 From there it was not hard to push out to the populated 
Inhamabane coast and simply cut off the main road to Maputo. 
But the push south failed to penetrate the populous Limpopo valley and came to a halt 
mid-1982. Late that year in a much more open showed of support, South Africa sent 
hundred of RENAMO men across the border from Kruger wildlife park. They tried to 
move to the sea south of the Limpopo valley and cut off the capital from the rest of the 
country. There was heavy fighting only 480 kilometres from Maputo. Nevertheless, 
FRELIMO was better known and much stronger support in Inhambane and Gaza 
provinces, particularly because a drought relief programme in 1980 saved many lives. 
Thus RENAMO was forced to switch to terrorizing people there.69 
In 1980s there was Operat;iio Cabana (Operation Shack). Operm;iio Cabana was a semi-
conventional operation organized by F AM and assisted by a team of Soviet military 
advisers, and used pseudo-guerrilla units. Their mission was to reconnoitre RENAMO 
positions and report them to conventional units stationed atF AM's forward command 
posts. Wearing civilian clothes and posing as RENAMO guerrillas when approaching 
villagers for information, the Patinas-trained pseudo units occasionally attacked 
RENAMO bases. The first phase of the operation was supposed to have started 
simultaneously from the Limpopo valley in the south to the Save River, and from Beira 
corridor to the north bank of the that river.70 
As a result of Operafiio Cabana, and other military actions such as Operation Zero, 
Operation Grapefruit, Operation Cobweb, and Operation Open Way for the Limpopo 
Corridor; peasants had fled into coastal zones, reserves, game wildlife parks, peri-urban, 
and urban areas, as well as into in the protected areas of the neighbouring countries, like 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland, looking for safe places, and provoking in these 
places environmental problems.71 
68Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire, London 1990, p226. 
69Ibid., p.226. 












The governmental boosted the construction of communal villages. The villagization 
program was rapidly becoming a military rather than an economic strategy. Peasant 
families resisting resettlement in communal villages saw their houses and belonging 
destroyed. In times of drought and floods, the government relief agency, the 
Departamento de Prevem;iio e Combate as Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN), used food 
as a weapon, refusing to distribute it to peasants resisting the resettlement program.72 
The depopulation of the rural areas worsened agricultural output. Meanwhile, writers 
closer to FRELIMO have generally attributed the conflict (and, consequently, agricultural 
collapse) to external causes, especially aggression by South African apartheid regime 
(see, for example, Hanlon 1984; Minter 1994 and Saul 1985, 1993). In contrast, 
progressive writers critical of FRELIMO emphasize its own political weaknesses as the 
main cause of failure of its agricultural policies (and, therefore, of the transformation of 
foreign-sponsored sabotage into war; see, for example, Cahen 1987, 1993; Chingono 
1994 and Geffray 1990; see also Clarence-Smith 1988). These perspectives reflect 
alternative answers to the question of whether or not RENAMO was primarily a 
Mozambican, rather than foreign, phenomenon. 
Until the armed conflict had disrupted road communications, preventing the flow of 
produce from the countryside to the main urban centres, the fields were being emptied of 
peasant farmers with the result that agricultural activity declined dramatically. A new 
cycle of food shortages ensured, plunging the country into greater food aid dependence 
from the international community with their involvement in Mozambique, government 
and non-government relief agencies from a number of Western countries contributed to 
the protracting of the war in that they strengthened the government's position by making 
up for the food shortages.73 
In September 1982, a RENAMO reconnaissance team left Inhambane for Maputo 
province to prepare for the start of military operations there. Two months later, a 
72http://www.kas.org.zalpublications/seminarReports/PoliticsofldentityandExclusion/thomashaus 











RENAMO contingent left southern Inhambane and joined forces with other units in 
Gaza. The joint force then proceeded to the south. Crossing the Limpopo River and then 
the Mazimechopes River, finally establishing a base in the northern region of Maputo 
province. However, Gaza province began to be seriously affected by RENAMO activities 
in late 1983.74 
By 1987 the war had spread to every district of province, severely crippling the 
province's economy and displacing over 100,000 people from their home. The disruption 
of peasant agricultural production caused by RENAMO attacks, compounded by severe 
drought conditions throughout most of this period, soon created widespread food 
shortages affecting a further 200-300,000 people. Rural-urban migration had sky-
rocketed, as people continued to flee the countryside in search of some measure of 
security in the cities, greatly straining already overburdened urban infrastructure.75 
The first RENAMO activity in the province came when the guerrillas attacked F AM 
positions near Mapulanguene on 6 and 7 December 1982. Ambushes were mounted on 
the Mapulanguene-Magude road on 12,13,and 17 December. The Magude-Chokwe 
railway line was sabotaged on 25 December. Gradually, guerrillas extended their activity 
up to the north bank of the Incomati River.76 These developments rang alarm bells in the 
FRELIMO camp. The government contemplated even more drastic measures in an 
attempt to halt the spread of the insurgency further south. 
Renouncing its amnesty pledge, in January 1983 FRELIMO dispatched two of its most 
senior members-the deceased Sebastillo Marcos Mabote and topical President Joaquim 
Alberto Chissano-to Macia and Magude in Maputo province to preside over the public 
execution of prisoners of war. In Magude on 11 January 1983, captured RENAMO 
guerrillas were put on display before a huge crowed. After a brief speech, Mabote 
73http://www.kas.org.zaJpublications/seminarReportslPoliticsofldentityExclusionithomashausen.p 
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ordered a firing squad to machine-gun the prisoners to death. Five days later in Magude, 
it was the tum of Joaquim Chissano to officiate at a similar event.77 
Nevertheless, guerrilla activity resumed in Gaza and Inhambane after pressure from 
Opera~iio Cabana eased off. However, RENAMO claimed to have overrun FAM's 
barracks at Chigubo, and clashed with government forces in the coastal town of Jangamo 
in 1983. Ambushes were done in Gaza's Nalzi-Dindiza road. The army barracks at 
Massangena and Machaila were attacked in early August. The stretch of the Maputo-
Zimbabwe railway line running through Gaza came under renewed sabotage. And there 
were ambushes on roads in the northern area of Maputo province.78 
These situations had provoked several environmental problems because of the excessive 
number of displaced populations. The governmental was being denied access to the 
hinterland. Primary health and educational services gradually ground to be a halt in the 
rural area.79 Thus three overall impressions came out during the war: 
i) the immense resourcefulness and resilience demonstrated by people in he face of 
enormous suffering; 
ii) the very different experiences undergone by different communities during the 
war- differences between coastal and inland and even neighbouring communities 
and; 
iii) the immense level of destruction, not only of infrastructure but especially of 
households livelihoods. 
In inland areas, particularly Massingir district, in Gaza, much of the population lived as 
refugees, however this experience was very different according to whether people were 
refugees in South Africa and whether they lived in camps or in local communities. In all 
77Ibid., p.2IO. 











areas, some households had experience of being displaced internally; often either living 
in the forest in RENAMO areas or in peri-urban areas controlled by the government. 
Many households had a whole succession of experiences, loosing possessions and 
sometimes family members at each stage.80 The experience of being displaced to a 
different part of the south of the country and perhaps more living as refugees in 
neighbouring countries probably broadened some peoples experiences. However it was 
quite difficult to quantify the practical implications of this on peoples returned. In 
Massingir the experience of women household members worked for wages while 
refugees in South Africa was to have changed gender relations. In Namaacha a women 
tried to start a women's mutual help group in her community, similar to one she had 
encountered as a refugee in Swaziland.81 
A particular feature of the late year of the war was drought. This increased suffering for 
those living off the land from 1990-1992, however the drought also helped end the war as 
the armies on both sides found it more difficult to live off the rural populations. 
In southern provinces the guerrilla attacks on government positions and communications 
routes were frequent. For example, in July 1984, the East Germany Embassy in Maputo 
ordered the withdrawal of its nationals working in Inhambane's gas fields, following a 
landmine incident in Macovane in which two Germans were killed. Further to the south, 
pressure continued to be exerted even closer to the Mozambican capital. Towards the end 
of January 1984, a 60-strong RENAMO group, led by Pedro Muting, crossed the 
Incomati River only days before the cyclone Domoina had ravaged the area, making the 
flooded river an impossible obstacle. The group split into three units of 20 men each, the 
first operating south of Ressano Garcia, the second north-east of the city of Maputo, and 
the third on the south bank of the Incomati River near the Moamba area.82 
79Ibid. , pp.220-221. 
8°Whiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at the Village Level-Mozambique, p.lO. 
81Ibid., p.lO. 











Because of the RENAMO's pressure, on 16 March 1984, it was the signing of the 
Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness between Mozambique 
and South Africa. South Africa undertook to withdraw its support of RENAMO; 
Mozambique, agreed to expel the ANC and open the country to South African 
investment. Despite the Nkomati Accord, promising an end to South African support for 
RENAMO, RENAMO's activities within Mozambique had intensified, facing the South 
African to search for a solution to the conflict.83 
By May 1984 the lack of tangible results from N'komati led the Mozambicans to request 
a top-level meeting in Cape Town at which the former Minister of Security Jacinto 
Veloso presented a dossier documenting cases of RENAMO allegedly being supplied by 
South Africa following the Accord. The South Africans responded by denying any 
government involvement, offering instead their good offices to bring about a negotiated 
settlement. 84 
The destruction of factories and break-up of the economic infrastructure were also aimed 
at bringing the government to negotiations. The use of anti-personnel mines, targeted at 
maiming rather than killing, was also a tactic used in these contested areas of the conflict. 
Captured arms and equipment had become the major source of supplies within 
RENAMO, but many of the its forces still had to operate without guns. There was also a 
psychological dimension to RENAMO's tactics. The objective behind many of these was 
to make population compliant to RENAMO. The use of maimed people was in a similar 
mould. Earless, noseless, or handless people were a convenient way of transmitting a 
permanent image of RENAMO's activities in areas where their presence remained 
marginal. 85 
The war had involved widespread violence against civilians, including both the 
systematic use of mutilations and killings and indiscriminate violence during sweeps 
83Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique'S War: The role of Mediation and Good Office, 
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through contested areas. The mutilations of civilians, by cutting off ears, noses, lips and 
sexual organs, and by mutilating corpses, had been one of the most characteristic abuses 
of the war in Mozambique. Contrary to claims by the RENAMO leadership, such abuses 
were neither isolated incidents, nor were they confined to the movement's days. Such 
incidents appeared to be a central part of RENAMO's strategy of advertising its presence 
and its strength, and of terrorizing the local population and the opposing soldiers. 
Government soldiers were also responsible for incidents ofmutilation.86 
This situation not only displaced a hundred thousands of Mozambicans to ecologically 
sensitive areas in neighbouring countries and along Mozambique's fragile coast, but also 
exerted excessive pressure on the environment, polluting these areas, cutting mangroves, 
decimating wildlife in national parks, causing widespread land degradation and 
disrupting environmental management. 87 Also the displaced population was concentrated 
in provinces with the highest agricultural potential; their settlements near major 
towns/cities of the coastal zones and safe rural areas had created severe land shortages, 
increased the demand for woodfuel and fishery resources, and threatened Mozambique'S 
mangroves ecosystems, which are vital to the country's shrimp and prawn industries.88 
However, forced recruitment was a characteristic both RENAMO and FAM used to 
obtain soldiers. In principle, all adult males were eligible for conscription into F AM. In 
practice, standard recruitment procedures coexisted which incidents of forcible 
conscription, in which young men were rounded up at gun-point to join the army. 
Forcible conscription also was the most common method used by RENAMO to obtain its 
combatants. Young men and boys were captured and taken to RENAMO bases, where 
they were compelled to join the RENAMO army. However, RENAMO did include some 
86Southern Africa, Peace Prospects in Mozambique: What is Afonso Dhlkama up to? In: Africa 
Watch, Vol.5, No.lO, July 1992, p.ll. 
87SARDC, Directory of Environmental Information and organizations in Southern Africa, Vol.l. 












volunteer soldiers, mostly those disillusioned with FRELIMO's former policies of 
socialist transformation.89 
In the mid-1980s RENAMO targeted a propaganda campaign against the capital, Map\1to, 
claiming that it would be captured in six months. The aim was to cause a sense of 
insecurity in the city, which had received many refugees with first-hand knowledge of 
RENAMO's policies in the countryside. The placing of two landmines on the Costa do 
Sol beach was particularly effective for this purpose, as the beach had become one of the 
few areas of recreation for Maputo's foreign community.9o 
In late 1982 it repulsed the major RENAMO offensive from South Africa. By late 1983, 
Zimbabwe had provided combat troops largely to protect its own access to sea. Although 
Zimbabwe's military involvement in Mozambique between 1982 and 1992 was mainly to 
protect Zimbabwe's trade routes through Mozambique, that involvement ended up having 
far-reaching political and military implications. Therefore, in the process of protecting 
their trade routes, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) literally joined the Mozambican 
armed conflict on the side of the Mozambican Government and ended up involvement at 
least 30,000 Zimbabwean troops.91 
Landmines were largely used both sides operations forces but in the end it was the 
peasants and infrastructures that fell victims. Landmines had been planted on the roads to 
fields, water sources, health centres, schools, factories and cemiteries. There was 
evidence that suggested that landmines played a role in discouraging displaced people 
from returning to their places of origin. In Inhambane and Gaza provinces water wells, 
clinics, schools, small factories, cashew-nuts groves and cattle-dip tanks were mined. No 
maps of these minefields were left behind when the conflict ended in 1992.92 
89Ibid., p.12. 












The FRELIMO forces and its allies used defensive mining as recourse to protect key 
economic infrastructures and other strategic places that could be the targets of sabotage 
or occupation by the guerrilla fighters of RENAMO. The FRELIMO forces used anti-
personnel landmines to protect power pylons. Access of roads and railway lines, dams, 
factories and water pipelines were protected the same way. Many hospitals and health 
posts were protected by the use of landmines to prevent ransacking by RENAMO. 
Nevertheless, landmines accidents occurred/occur in the course of pursuance of the 
following activities: Work on the farm; search for firewood; illegal crossing of borders; 
animal grazing; transit; playing with explosives; cutting down of poles for building and 
unknown activities.93 
Therefore, the total impact of conflict on Mozambican society was literary incalculable. 
Tens of thousands had been killed in the war and hundreds of thousands by the associated 
hunger and disease. Much of the infrastructure of the society had been destroyed, and 
national income was at a lower level than before independence. Education had come 
virtually to a standstill, and an entire generation had grown up without knowing the 
benefits of even the most basic physical security, let alone social services or economic 
development. The total cost of the war was incalculable. The United Nations estimated 
that war and war-related hunger and disease had cost a total of 600,000 lives, but this was 
no more than a gross estimate. Most of the country's economic infrastructure was 
destroyed or inoperable. And much of the population was dependent on a massive 
international aid programme. Hundreds of thousands of people were refugees in 
neighboring countries or displaced inside Mozambique. Many rural areas had been 
reduced to a Stone-Age condition, without trade or modem manufactured goods, 
education or health services and suffering from constant insecurity. 
92 Arquivo do Patrim6nio Cultural (ARP AC), Mines and Demining in Mozambique. Proceeding of 
the Seminar on the Socio-Cultural and Economic Impact of Mines and Deminig in Mozambique, 
organized by ARPAC, Maputo 2000, p.9.p.34. 











An Attempt at Periodisation 
This purpose of this section is to present a periodisation of the armed conflict in southern 
Mozambique from 1980 to 1992. The conflict began to affect this region as it spread from 
the centre of Mozambique in the early 1980s. The section also argues, against the 
FRELIMO line, that resistance by the Mozambican peasantry to FRELIMO's 
modernising Marxist project was a primary cause of the war. The periodisation divides 
the conflict into four phases, namely the beginning of armed conflict, crisis and 
intensification, pre-negotiation and political change, and negotiating the Rome accord. 
The Start of Armed Conflict in Southern Mozambique, 1980-1984 
In the early 1980s, RENAMO (known in its early years as the MNR) began to grow 
rapidly in size and military effectiveness, which enabled it to launch a campaign to 
destroy social and economic infrastructure throughout southern Mozambique. Furnished 
with ample military supplies from South Africa, RENAMO's strength increased from 
fewer than 1,000 men to an estimated 8,000 fighters between 1980 and 1982, and its 
operations spread from the central provinces of Manica and Sofala into the south, 
especially Gaza and Inhambane.94 South Africa had become involved in RENAMO with 
the independence of Zimbabwe.95 The transfer of RENAMO from Southern Rhodesia to 
the South Africa in 1980 marked a turning point in the armed conflict, which soon began 
to escalate. The apartheid regime used RENAMO as a tool for destabilising Mozambique 
and as a counter balance to Mozambique'S support for the ANC. Its aims were to disable 
Mozambique'S infrastructure and economy, thereby bringing FRELIMO to the 
negotiating table, and to overthrow FRELIMO, replacing it with a more amenable 
RENAMO's government.96 Therefore, it was Pretoria's regime strategy to force 
FRELIMO to stop its support for to ANC. 
94Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique,pp.1-16; and Human Rights Watch Africa, 
Landmines in Mozambique, New York 1992, p.2 
95Ghali The United Nations and Mozambique,p.9; Vines, RENAMO, pp.1-16; and Honwana, 
Spiritual Agency and self Renewal in Southern Mozambique, p.166. 











The conflict gathered momentum between 1981 and 1984, as the apartheid regime in 
South Africa pursued its destabilisation policy. South African commandos raided ANC 
houses in Matola, an industrial suburb of Maputo, killing thirteen ANC members in early 
1981. In March of the same year, Mozambican and South African troops clashed on the 
border. In August 1982 the prominent South African exile, Ruth First, was murdered by 
a letter bomb sent to her at Eduardo Mondlane University in an action later blamed on a 
death squad by one of its former members, Dirk Coetzee.97 
Drought, War and Environmental Problems 
The war spread to Gaza and Inhambane in 1982, when RENAMO forces began a major 
push.98 It had begun to intensify in the early 1980s when South Africa took control over 
RENAMO, moving its base into Phalaborwa, in the northern Transvaal, revitalising the 
movement and using it in support of its own objectives of regional destabilisation.99 
Under pressure from RENAMO activities, the FRELIMO government re-introduced the 
death penalty for crimes against the security of people and state, and for those whose 
reintegration into society was deemed impossible. lOo At the same time, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe signed a security co-operation agreement on 20 October 1980, aimed at 
destroying theRENAMO movement.101 Agricultural production was disrupted as fields 
were mined, property destroyed and peasants and rural populations driven away to 
Maputo, Xai-Xai, Inhambane and other cities, as well as towards the coastal zones, 
provoking serious environmental problems. 
Despite the impact of the conflict, problems such as urbanisation must always be seen in 
the light of the historical context, geographical constraints and the nature of the 
governing economy. In the case of southern Mozambique political events of recent years 
had had such an extraordinary impact on everyday life, in every sector of society, that 
97David Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the reform Process in Mozambique: 
An Africa Watch Report. New York 1992, p.29. 
98Ibid., p.29. 
99Vines, The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, London 1998, p.14. 
IOOJeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Vines, The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, 
London 1998, pp.14-16. 











development environmental problems and the attempts to resolve them cannot be 
understood without some grasp of previous conditions. 
Amidst the violence, the entire southern region of Mozambique was also hit by the worst 
drought of the century in 1983. The most dramatic situation was in the southern third of 
the country, south of the River Save.102 In such towns as Maxixe, in Inhambane province, 
Xai-Xai in Gaza province, and Maputo, the fighting and population movement had 
provoked an upsurge in building. However, the majority of displaced persons lived in 
huge, unplanned cani~o areas (housing built of reeds and mud), on land owned by 
urbanised Mozambican families. The available land was usually too swampy for normal 
construction, and was thus avoided by the planners, or it was potentially valuable and was 
leased only on a temporary and speculative basis. 
Surprisingly, the situation in the cani~o areas was improved by the influx of the displaced 
persons during the conflict, although the whole social and political context was 
completely different before the armed conflict began. 
Water had to be brought from cantinas, stores that were linked to the city water network. 
When they were located in the cani~o, these stores were provided with boreholes, pumps 
and reservoirs. The women had to carry water up to a kilometre along sandy lanes.103 
Displaced persons in towns had a new feeling of security-an end to the constant fear of 
attack at any time. Those among them who had found employment just started to build 
wherever they found it convenient. Those who could afford it began building large 
houses with brick or cement blocks. A construction boom took place and the organic and 
structure less form of the calico areas rapidly started to solidity, further reducing the 
chances of infrastructural upgrading without major demolition. However, the social 
l02Hume, Ending Mozambique's War, p.x. 
l03Ingemar Saevfors, Maxaguene a comprehensive account of the first urban upgrading 












mood, political enthusiasm and belief in the future were more positive and greater than 
ever. 104 
The upgrading methods used by the popUlations who found employment in the cities 
were not exceptional, but they had more opportunity to develop than other displaced 
persons in the rural interior of southern Mozambique, largely due the level of 
mobilization FRELIMO had already attained for other purposes. The local administrative 
structures, the grupos dinamizadores (literally, 'dynamising groups'), staged campaigns 
and political meetings, cultural events, adult literacy programmes, street clean-up 
operations and mass vaccinations. They already knew how to get organised quickly, and 
therefore methods could be developed taking this asset into account. Furthermore they 
had a degree of political maturity: even given the high expectations of the government, 
the grupos dinamizadores had a reasonable understanding of unpopular measures 
benefiting a long term common goal.105 
Among the areas worst hit by the spread of the fighting were Chicualacuala district in 
Gaza province, and Mabote, Govuro and Vilankulos in Inhambane province. But at that 
time, with the drought, these zones had had no rainfall. In the three southern provinces 
(Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane) the drop in agricultural production, was of the order of 
70 to 80 percent. In 1983 estimated 1,300,000 tonnes of grain and cassava had already 
been lost year.106 Also lost in 1983 was the greater part (30,000 tonnes) of the rice harvest 
at the country's largest state farm, the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex (CAlL). By 
year in the district of Manjacaze in Gaza, war and drought had made agriculture virtually 
impossible.107 
Armed conflict and drought forced the people of Chicualacuala district to abandon their 
homes and move from place to place leading to the separation of families. The immediate 
food and energy needs of the existing communities exerted strong pressure on forest and 
l04Ibid., p.lO. 
105Ibid., pp.l0-25. 
l06Mozambique Information Office (MIO), No.8, 16 June, London 1983. 











soil resources. In areas where there was enough security during the war, there was a 
strong concentration of migrant populations, due to existing production possibilities. This 
fact associated with the low value and lack of respect given to the existing indigenous 
knowledge system and ancient agriculture techniques, meant that there were few 
possibilities for the application of basic norms of land resource exploitation to secure the 
preservation of resources. lOS 
People were displaced internally from one area to another and refugee problems were 
created for neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. The refugees 
were accommodated in such refugee centres as that in Chambuta, Zimbabwe, or Giyani, 
South Africa. 
A population concentration in a limited geographic area, without necessary or adequate 
sanitation, .has a profound impact on the sanitary conditions of members of the 
community. The environmental problems in these areas were partially a consequence of 
the socio-economic situation of the population, itself a result of the prolonged war 
between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Environmental problems also arose because of the 
drought that had been affecting the country. Poor housing conditions, poor nutrition and 
low levels of production in such concentrated populations made them susceptible to 
epidemic diseases, without the resources to fight them. 
In 1983 it was reported that over 100,000 people had died of famine in Inhambane alone. 
Famine began to spread southwards, reaching the outskirts of the capital, Maputo. In 
Maputo province, about 248,000 people faced serious food shortages. Another 22,000 
were displaced following RENAMO attacks along the border between Mozambique and 
South Africa. In Inhambane, some 430,000 people were described as being at risk. In 
some provinces, including Gaza, over half the peasant surplus production was going to 
the black market, popularly known as candonga. I09 
108Vieika Garibaldi, Indigenous Knowledge System in Natural Resources Management in 
Southern Africa: case Studies from Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambigue, Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, Harare 1995, p.178. 











The vast majority of deaths caused directly by hunger in this period in drought-stricken 
southern Mozambique occurred in the areas most badly affected by the armed conflict. In 
Gaza and Inhambane, eleven districts (out of a total of 17) were badly affected by armed 
conflict. There were direct confrontations between government forces and RENAMO, 
resulting in the destruction of RENAMO camps including their "central base~' in Gaza at 
Hati-Hati, and their operational base for southern Mozambique at Tome in Inhambane 
province.110 In the eleven districts affected by conflict, seven in Inhambane and four in 
Gaza, RENAMO started serious military operations in the first quarter of 1982. Between 
then and October 1983, RENAMO destroyed more than 400 cantinas in Inhambane, most 
of them owned by small traders.1l1 
Drought and food shortages are common in southern Mozambique. But these phenomena 
combined with conflict, drove people to the urban areas, and helped to increase some 
kinds of pollution, especially in coastal zones. The increased migration to urban and 
coastal areas had concomitant and adverse environmental consequences. Desertification 
was occurring as well as the pollution of surface and coastal waters.112 
Operation Production 
Operation Production was a massive government and FRELIMO party operation that 
began in February in 1983 until in the middle of 1985 aimed at forcibly relocating tens of 
thousands of urban unemployed, single women and other "marginals" from Maputo to 
forced labour in the far north of Mozambique. 1l3 It was launched at a time when the 
southern Mozambican rural economy was buckling under the combined blows of neglect 
of peasant agriculture, widening armed conflict, and drought. 114 The collapse of 
marketing in the countryside, the government~s use of scarce resources to finance 
inefficient state farms, and Pretoria's decision to reduce the number of Mozambican 
migrant workers in South Africa, all drove thousands of unemployed into Mozambican 
1I0Mozambique Information Office, News Review no.7, 27 May, London 1983. 
lIlMozambique Information Agency (AIM), 1112/, Maputo 1983. 













towns and cities. Food shortages and crime soared in Maputo and other major southern 
Mozambican urban centres such as Xai-Xai, Chokwe, Inhambane and Maxixe. At the 
same time, big state farms, like Xinavane Sugar Cane Plantations were chronically short 
of seasonal workers. I IS 
Some observers have compared the government's response with the forced labour 
practices of the colonial period.116 the "Operayao Produyao" or Operation Production 
aimed to push the unemployed and petty criminals out of the towns and to the land, an 
objective that many city residents applauded at the time.. But the plan soon ran into 
difficulties, and aroused increasing opposition. After a first, voluntary phase in mid-1983, 
the programme, which was run jointly by the Ministries of Defence, Security, and the 
Interior, began to roundup large numbers of people who were unable to produce at least 
four key documents, namely work, residence, and military service cards, and the identity 
document. Residents in Maputo were given two weeks to update their papers. I I? 
Early Attempts at Negotiation, and the Nkomati Accord 
The sustained violence and the devastating famine finally forced the Mozambique 
government, still ruling over a one-party state under FRELIMO control, to engage in 
negotiations, at first with the South Africans themselves. The first such attempt to put an 
end to hostilities came on 16 March 1984 when President Samora Moies Machel met 
P.W. Botha, the Sout~ African Prime Minister at the border town ofNkomati to sign the 
"Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good-Neighbourliness". 1 18 Mozambique was 
required to close down any ANC military facilities in its territory, and in return, the South 
Africans were to halt their support of RENAMO. However, with airlifts and transport 
1l5Ib'd 2 I ., p .. 
116Hanlon, Mozambigue;p. 26; and Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction, p.68. 
1l7Hanlon, Mozambique, p.246; and Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction, p.8. 
1l8Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, p.lO; and Kerry Ruth Ward, The 
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routes through Malawi, South Africa continued to supply RENAMO with food, 
medication, and weapons, including large numbers oflandmines. 119 
From May to October 1984, the Mozambican government was reluctantly persuaded to 
engage in direct talks with the MNR. Various carrots and sticks were employed. 120 
President Machel signed the pact in large part to satisfY political conditions placed on the 
delivery of United States humanitarian aid. The Nkomati Pact had been opposed by 
Zimbabwe and the other Front Line States, who feared the South Africans were 
negotiating in bad faith and would not halt their support for RENAMO under any 
circumstances. 121 The Mozambican government took an independent line by reluctantly 
agreeing to negotiate directly with RENAMO. However, aware continuing South African 
support for RENAMO, the Mozambican government insisted that the talks be facilitated 
and mediated by the Pretoria regime. The two rounds of negotiation took place from 
May to October 1984. But the mediators were not impartial, nor did they engage in 
thorough consultations. 
An atmosphere of mistrust permeated the talks, and statements were misinterpreted. 
Eventually failure was declared and both sides adopted extremist positions. Machel 
publicly stated that he would not negotiate with kidnappers, bandits and criminals. 
Instead Mozambique would wipe them out, and that day was not far off. On the other side 
RENAMO demanded the country's presidency for itself.122 This half-hearted attempt to 
negotiate peace marked the end of the first phase of the war in the south. 
The Intensification of the Armed Conflict, 1984-1988 
After of the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984, various restrictions were introduced. 
One of these was the "guia de marcha". The guia was a kind of internal passport, 
originally used in colonial times and needed by anyone who wanted to travel from one 
district or province to another. The guia remained in force until November 1990 with the 
119http://www.usc.eduJdeptILAS/iricis/cews/databaselMozambique/mozambique.pdf 












promulgation of the new constitution, which guaranteed freedom of movement. 
Meanwhile, Operation Production was abandoned, and government officials admitted 
that it had been a failure that cost FRELIMO a great deal of political support. RENAMO 
supporters argued, with some force, that it had been FRELIMO's agricultural policies 
that had exacerbated the problem of rural unemployment in the first place, and sent 
youths fleeing to the cities in search of work.123 Most of those sent to the camps and 
villages were never able to return.124 Many observers as for example, senior church 
leaders believed that Operation Production, like the communal village program, provided 
a major boost to RENAMO's recruitment in the south ofMozambique.125 
Throughout the conflict, a basic aim of both the government and RENAMO forces had 
been to control as many civilians as possible. Both the government and RENAMO 
practised scorched earth methods and used military force to move hundreds of thousands 
of civilians into their own areas of control. Once they had them settled, the local military 
force established control posts to ensure that the civilians did not flee to the enemy.126 
In the months leading up to the Nkomati Agreement in March 1984, South Africa 
delivered significant quantities of military aid to RENAMO, which allowed them to 
mount attacks throughout southern Mozambique and to bring the conflict closer to 
Maputo city.127 The increased fighting led to second round of talks, in October 1985, 
when South Africa then proceeded to mediate the fist attempt at negotiations between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO in Pretoria but 128 The sides signed the Pretoria Declaration 
(sometimes referred to as "N'komati II") in which RENAMO agreed to recognized the 
FRELIMO government in exchange for a phased cease-fire under South African 
auspices. RENAMO,s insistence that it be recognised as a legitimate negotiating partner, 
however, doomed the new agreement. In November of that year, in 1985, it announced a 
122http://www.usc.eduldeptl LAS/ir/cis/cews/databaselMozambiquelMozambique.pdf 
123Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction, pp.69-70. 
124Ibid., pp.69-70. 
125Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction, p.pp.69-70; Hanlon, Mozambique, pp.26-28. 
126Hoile, Conspicuous Destruction, p.70. 












further escalation of the war, prompting President Samora Machel to accuse Pretoria of 
failing to destroy RENAMO. These talks soon collapsed.129 
The Failure of the Talks and Intensification of the Conflict 
The failure of the talks led to a further intensification of the conflict between 1985 and 
1986. Neither President Machel's death in 1986, nor the ascension of Joaquim Chissano 
into the presidency had much effect. By 1987 RENAMO had gained substantial ground 
across southern Mozambique and was receiving indirect encouragement and backing 
from a number of conservative and right wing governments in the west and elsewhere in 
Africa. 130 
By 1987, the conflict had begun to take a heavy toll on the government, forcing President 
Chissano to modify many of FRELlMO' s original policies and positions under pressure 
from the international community. He introduced Programa de ReestruturafOo 
Economica(PRE ).131 As the conflict intensified in the south, massacres and atrocities 
occurred. One such was the Homoine massacre on July 18, 1987, in Inhambane. The 
official death toll was 424. The government blamed RENAMO for the slaughter, a charge 
which the rebels denied. Indeed, RENAMO later accused the government army of 
carrying out the killings in order to damage their international reputation.132 Also in 1987, 
the town of Manjacaze in Gaza suffered a similar atrocity as the conflict intensified , 
when over 90 people were massacred. This left the town in a desolate condition, with 
shops, warehouses and other businesses in ruins, or reduced to ashes. 133 
Another badly affected area was Massingir district in Gaza. This district is in the western 
part of the province (see map) and borders the Kruger Park in South Africa. The war 
128Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995, p.l0 
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affected the district from 1984 onwards, restricting people's access to their fields, as a 
consequence of which crop production fell. Attacks intensified, eventually cutting the 
district capital off from the rest of the province by road. The town had to be supplied by 
air. People were killed in the attacks and some were captured by RENAMO. From 1986 
onwards, people began to flee from the outlying areas and by 1988-1989 most of them, 
with the exception of those near the lakeshore and in the district capital, were gone.134 
RENAMO forces attacked and occupied Chibuto district, the main government military 
headquarters in Gaza province in 1988. For the fifth time in less than two months 
RENAMO units disrupted Maputo's electricity supplies on 31 December 1988.135 
Because of this violence in this period, Mozambicans were forced by government forces 
and RENAMO into refugee camps, became displaced persons or were forced into the 
urban and peri-urban areas or towards the coastal zones where they felt relatively safe. 
Pre-Negotiation and Political Changes, 1984-1990 
We now move on to the third period. Three particular aspects of the conflict stand out: 
1. it was waged largely in rural areas; 
2. it revolved primarily around the control of civilian populations by both sides for 
tactical reasons; and 
3. it was extremely violent. 
However, RENAMO in particular developed a reputation for the ritualistic use of 
violence aimed at instilling incapacitating fear in rural communities. These tactics served 
severely to disrupt the social fabric and to undermine the legitimacy of the government 
which was unable to protect large parts of southern Mozambique.136 
41Whiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at the Village Level-Mozambique, p.140. 
135Ibid., p.140. 











War, Drought, Floods, Displaced Persons and Food Shortages 
The south had been severely affected by drought in the 1990s. For example, 240 
kilometres of the Limpopo river ran dry leaving huge tracts of sandy trenches where 
water once flowed. I37 In combination with drought and conflict there were, for example, 
at least 1,600 displaced persons in Chokwe district. The province of Gaza had over 
100,000 displaced persons.138 Crop theft and raids by RENAMO combined with drought 
to bring dependency and disease to the province.139 
In central Gaza, particularly in the districts of Massangena, Chigubo, Chicualacuala, 
Mabalane and Massingir, people constantly moved from one area to another in search of 
relatively secure areas and food to survive. A total of 3,684 returnees from South Africa 
and Zimbabwe were settled in Chicualacuala, Massingir and Chokwe in 1989.140 Over 
56,000 people were facing severe food shortage. RENAMO forced people into a nomadic 
existence, unable to cultivate their fields and produce food for their own subsistence. 
Excessively the heavy rains that washed away maize sown in September and December 
of 1989 exacerbated the situation.141 At same time the war was intensified all over the 
south. On 17 March 1989 RENAMO attacked two warehouses belonging to the Lonrho-
Mozambique Agricultural Company (LOMACO), in Chokwe district. Large quantities of 
goods stored in the warehouses were destroyed, including irrigation equipment, fertilisers 
and pesticides, worth millions of meticais. 
Pre-Negotiation 
Although the conflict continued to escalate throughout the mid-1980s, there were already 
sectors of society, notably religious leaders, and other regional actors who were 
attempting to initiate a peace process. As early as 1984, the Mozambican Christian 
Council (MCC)- which united seventeen of the country's Protestant Churches- set up 
the Peace and Reconciliation Commission (PRC). They argued that dialogue was the way 
137Mozambique Information Office: Special Report No. 10, London 28 May 1992. 
138Mozambique information Office, No.1 0, London 28 May 1992. 
13"Mozambique Information Office, No.1 0, London May, 28/511992. 
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forward in any dispute. At the same time, the Catholic Church, which had an ambivalent 
relationship with government due to its historic ties with the Portuguese publicly called 
for dialogue between the government and RENAMO.142 
By 1987, under the presidency of Chissano, the Church was openly advocating dialogue. 
Between 1987 and 1988, the MCC joined forces with the Catholic Church, and held 
several meetings with RENAMO representatives in the United States and in Kenya. By 
1988, these church activities had become public.143 
Renamo's Position 
During these talks, Mozambican government was carrying out a military offensive 
against RENAMO, and the movement's leaders refused as a result to return to the 
discussions.144 President Chissano rejected this position, saying that it was precisely 
because there was conflict that dialogue was necessary to end the war. In effect, some of 
the internal conditions necessary for initiating dialogue (war fatigue, stalemate) 
existed.145 Externally too, the regional and international political arena was changing. At 
the end of 1988 Cold War was ending in Southern Africa. FRELIMO abandoned its 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and dropped its objections to pluralism in 1989.146 
Internationally, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe in late 1989 and 1990 marked the advent of a new era of optimism and 
willingness to end the proxy wars of the Cold War years. Negotiations for a Mozambican 
peace started in August 1989, but soon faltered as it became evident that the groundwork 
was stilllacking.147 
142http://www.usc.eduideptILAS/ir/cis/cews/databaselMozambiqueImozambique.pdf 
143Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp.245-246; and 
http://www,usc.eduideptlir/cis/cews/databaselMozambique/mozambique.pdf 
144Mozambique Information Office, No.187, 5 October 1990, p.2. 
145Hume, Ending Mozambique'S War, p.22. 












Negotiation, the Rome Talks and the General Peace Accord, 1990-1992 
In July 1990, FRELIMO decided to abandon the one-party state in favour of a multi-party 
system. On 30 November 1990 a new Constitution, unilaterally drafted and approved by 
the FRELIMO party and the government, came into effect. By 1990 Sant' Egidio, a 
Roman Catholic lay organization dedicated to social concerns had developed strong ties 
with the Mozambican government and church groups around the country, as well as with 
RENAMO. 148 It was regarded as a trusted and impartial intermediary in the conflict, with 
legitimacy and leverage in the eyes of both sides.149 
From the vulnerability of the displaced persons war, drought and torrential rains had 
killed over 50 people at Chibuto district, in the southern Mozambican province of Gaza 
between 1990/1991. The tragedy had also happened at Missavene, on the outskirts of the 
towns of Chibuto. At the same time, heavy rains accompanied by hail led to a mudslide 
which swept away flimsy houses built on slopes on the banks of the Changane river. The 
houses had been built by people displaced by armed conflict. Some of dead were buried 
in the mud, while others drowned in the river. The storm coincided with a RENAMO 
incursion which had killed at least five people. ISO 
Meanwhile, the war was spreading into the outer suburbs of the capital in a generalised 
breakdown of law and order. In January 1992, eighteen people died in RENAMO raids 
against the three Maputo suburbs of Patrice-Lumumba, Ndlavela and T-3, less than ten 
kilometres from the city centre. These suburbs, Ndlavela in particular, had come under 
repeated attack in 1991. Ndlavela was largely inhabited by displaced people who had fled 
from the war-tom countryside. lsi 
147Hume,EndingMozambique' s War,p.22;and 
http://www.usc.eduideptILAS/ir/cis/cews/databaselMozambique/mozambique.pdf 
148Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995, p.15; and Hume, Ending 
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Meanwhile, in Rome, progress was slow but steady. By October 1992, most issues had 
been resolved. Governments in the southern African region, including a now-
democratising South Africa, were supportive. The United Nations agreed to send 
monitors and troops to uphold the agreement, and the Italian government agreed to 
donate US$lO million towards RENAMO's transformation into a political party. 152 
After two years, on 4 October 1992, and with the involvement of Southern African and 
European governments, the United States, the United Nations, and a major international 
corporation, not to mention SantI Egidio itself, the Rome General Peace Accord was 
signed.153 The Mozambican conflict had finally come to an end. 
151Vines, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? University of York 1992, 
~~.l~7-129. 
IbId., pp.127-129. 












An Environmental Profile of the Effects of Conflict in southern 
Mozaulbique 
The environment in the Context of Conflict 
The concept of the environment is a broad term that includes both physical, biological 
and social impacts in which the men and the organisms live. Changes in productivity of 
downstream agricultural fields or fisheries are included, as question of population 
resettlement. Environmental effects may occur upstream, on-site, or downstream. 
Therefore, the environment is the existence of some impact, on the economic well-being 
or social welfare of people and societies.154 That is, the soil and the basement, the 
atmosphere, the water of the sea, of rivers and of the lakes, the set of the plants and of the 
animals and forces and actions that link them, are physical, biological and social factors 
whose balance is necessary so that the human life can endure.155 Environmental problems 
are all these external conditions, especially physical conditions, sometimes caused by 
man, and by natural effects, effecting the lives of people, animals and plants. Therefore, 
although methods, sources and focus vary, at the core of environmental history is a 
deliberation on how people use, manage or interrelate with natural resources and natural 
environment, in specific circumstances at given times and places.156 
The environmental problems in Southern Mozambique existed before conflict. They were 
provoked by natural disasters such as droughts, cyclones and floods that happened 
between 1980s to 1990s. As result of these phenomena, there were movements of 
displaced populations. The armed conflict accelerated these environmental problems. 
154Matiza, and H. N. Chabwela, Wetlands Conservation Conference for Southern Africa: 
Proceeding of the SADCC wetlands conference. Gaberone 1992, pA6. 
155Jos6 Forjaz, Passar as futuras gera9l'5es urn Mundo onde seja possivel viver: 0 Dia Mundial do 
Ambiente. In: Jornal Notfcias, Maputo, 6 de Junho de 1984.(Unpagened). 
156Stephen Dovers et aI, South Africa's Environmental History Cases and Comparisons. In David 











And these problems have continued after war. IS7 Drought conditions applied again in 
several parts of country and elsewhere in southern Mozambique, but the grave food 
shortages in the country were attributed by the United Nations and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) to military disturbances. But the manner in which drought and 
armed conflict interacted to cause famine seemed to follow a different pattern. The 1983 
famine deaths were, to put it in the simplest terms, a consequence of armed conflict 
disrupting relief to drought-affected areas. The terror that reigned in the countryside had 
forced thousands of people to flee from their homes, often leaving their crops in the 
fields, arriving in the districts or over coastal zones without land, tools, and seed.15S 
People had fled from more productive areas to more remote and less fertile areas with 
lower potential. The further argument was advanced that, being restricted to closed areas, 
a gradually increasing rural popUlation, over the years reduced the fallow periods, 
brought poorer land into cultivation, and repeatedly farmed the same plots without time 
for recovery. These factors tended to reduce the overall production and productivity of an 
area and certainly reduced the average production levels for each household, and might 
generate a further downward spiral by adversely affecting the local climate, reducing 
moisture retention in the soi1.159 
Because of these factors, the main environmental threats were almost exclusively located 
along the coastal littoral, peri-urban and urban areas of southern Mozambique. The 
populations fleeing the fighting in interior and, also looking for safe places because of the 
floods and droughts had concentrated along the coastal, peri-urban and urban areas, and 
the environmental pressure in these areas were becoming severe. Thus halfthe population 
had been affected through massive civilian losses, malnutrition, displacement and 
157Lionel Cliffe, et aI., Southern Africa the Drought a Breakdown of Social reproduction: in Leeds 
Southern Africa Studies, University of Leeds 1988, pp.2-26; and Lidia B.Y. Fernandes, National 
Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife Biomass Energy Unit Maputo 1996, pp.16-28. 












migration, and no reasonable environmental management strategy was initiated under 
these circumstances. 160 
Coral reefs and coastal wetlands are among the most productive marine ecosystems along 
the tropical southern Mozambique. On the Indian Ocean shore of southern Mozambique 
coral reefs and coastal wetlands contribute some uncountable tons of fish, providing 
protein and employment to some million people. However, this food production is but a 
part of the productive potential of these reefs and wetlands, since they export nutrients 
and organic matter, not only to the deep ocean, but also to other ecosystems. In addition 
these systems protect the sea-shore against destructive wave action, and whole reefs and 
protect beaches provide recreation for increasing number ofpeople.161 
These systems were endangered, not only by their traditional use, but by popUlation 
growth in these areas during the war. The population growth tended to lead to over-
exploitation of the limited resources that these sensitive ecosystem supported, and 
population increase changed in the coastal zone, like pollution, agricultural growth and 
construction, cutting mangroves and provoking its deforestation and soil erosion. Some 
of these changes could be harmful, not only directly to the species that build and conserve 
these systems, but also indirectly, by affecting their physical environment.162 
Mangroves have been defined as salt-tolerant forest ecosystem of tropical and subtropical 
intertidal regions of the world, and more broadly, as the characteristic littoral plant 
formations of tropical and subtropical sheltered coastlines. Mangroves have been 
variously described as coastal woodland, tidal forest and mangrove forest. Also the 
mangroves represent a rich and diverse living resource and are valuable to both the 
economy and protection of coastal environments.163 During the duration of the conflict, in 
1600'Keefe et aI.,· Mozambican Environmental Problem: myths and realities, in: Public 
Administration and Development, Vol. I I, London 1991, p.307; Matiza and Chabwela, Wetlands 
Conservation Conference for Southern Africa, pp.133-151. 
161Matiza and Chabwela, Wetlands Conservation Conference for Southern Africa, pp.133-3l8. 
1620'Keefe, Mozambican Environmental Problems, p.307. 
163 A.K. Semesi, "Mangrove Management and Utilization in Eastern Africa." Ambo 27, No.8, 











parts of Gaza, in southern Inhambane, and the area to the north Maputo, mangroves were 
destroyed by popUlation concentrations in the littoral zones entailing the risks of 
environmental degradation and resources depletion. 164 
To discuss environmental problems in the context of armed conflict and see a policy for 
sustainable development in specific conflict context, it means recognizing that the armed 
conflict had removed the potential population stress on the environment in large areas 
and magnified it in the sites of fleeing population concentrations.165 In the coastal areas, 
environmental stress was experienced, in particular with cutting of the mangroves which 
had a negative environmental effects and had reduced fishing potential. The mangroves 
represent a rich and diverse living resource and are valuable to both the economy and 
protection of coastal environments. The most pressing conservation problems that needed 
to be solved were the increase in tree cutting for poles, charcoal and fuelled and 
reclamation for salt pans, agriculture and prawn aquaculture.166 
There was a growing awareness of the importance and fragility of the mangrove 
ecosystem in southern Mozambique, particularly in Gaza and Maputo provinces. There 
was not environmental education, technical facility and information network among the 
populations. Therefore, the environmental stress was both a cause and an effects of 
political tension, military conflict and natural disasters. Land clearing for refugee camps 
sites and displaced persons areas, popUlation concentrations in marginal lands because of 
floods and drought, construction material, fuelwood, agricultural crop production, and 
wildlife use was a major threat to forest resources in the refugee and internally displaced 
populated areas. 167 
1640'Keefe, Mozambican Environmental Problems, p.307; and Matiza and Chabwela, Wetlands 
Conservation Conference for Southern Afric1!, pp.133-151. 
165 A. Ellegard , Cooking Fuel Smoke and Respiratory Symptoms Among Women in Low-Income 
Areas in Maputo. In: environmental Health Perspectives 104, No.9, September 1996, pp.980-
985. 
166Semesi, "Mangrove Management and Utilization in Eastern Africa.", pp.620-626. 
167Ellegard, "Cooking Fuel Smoke and Respiratory Symptoms Among Women in Low-Income 











In the suburbs of Maputo, for example, the fuels most commonly used were wood and 
charcoal. Therefore, coal and charcoal for household use was a competitive fuel on the 
local market. "And wood users were exposed to significantly higher levels of particulate 
pollution during cooking time (1200 mu glm3) than charcoal users (540 mu glm3)".168 
The immediate cause of mass movement of refugees and displaced persons might appear 
to be political upheaval and military violence. But the underlying causes often included 
the deterioration of the natural resource base and its capacity to support the population. 
However, floods and drought also contributed in environmental problems in Southern 
Mozambique. Half the population was affected with over one million Mozambican 
refugees, currently in neighbouring countries and many of the rest fleeing to the relative 
safety of the cities, the coastal strip and transport corridors.169 
Problematizing the Concept of the 
Environmental Impact of Conflict: 
Displaced persons and the environment 
In Southern Mozambique the armed conflict generally affected the populations later (mid 
to 1980s) than CentreINorth. And in the CentreINorth the conflict started in the early 
eighties. During this period atrocities were carried out against the civilian population by 
both sides in conflict. Inland areas, much of the popUlation lived as displaced persons or 
refugee, however, there was very different according to people were refugees in 
neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Swaziland. 170 
During the conflict, the rural population was the principal victim, and to a lesser extent of 
environmental hazards. The urban population, however, bore the burden of population 
inflows to escape the armed conflict and of structural adjustment which could create 
168Ibid., pp.983-985. 
1690'Keefe, Mozambique environmental problems, pp.307-311. 
17OWhiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at Village Level-Mozambique: Environment 











enormous difficulties such as food, water or fuel since the volume of basic commodities 
and the value of earnings had both declined.l7l 
Over three million people in rural areas suffered from food shortages either because of 
displacement or because armed conflict had affected rural production systems. 2.7 
million people in urban areas were dependent on imported supplies because of the 
collapse of the Mozambican food production and food marketing system no more than 10 
per cent of the marketed food was internally produced. Additionally, over one million 
people had sought refuge in neighbouring countries to escape the armed conflict.172 
The displaced persons situation had wrought havoc on the country. They came almost 
entirely from rural areas, and end up living from somebody else's generosity on land that 
was not theirs to farm. They had sometimes fled hundreds and even thousands of 
kilometres and usually left behind all their possessions. Arriving with nothing, with no 
roots or means of supporting themselves, leaving behind land that was no longer farmed, 
creating massive burdens in their huge numbers on the areas in which they settled, they 
were the devastation in southern Mozambique.173 
The consequences of extreme poverty were particularly severe when combined with 
insecurity of life style. Displaced persons suffered the full severity of these consequences. 
Perhaps the most striking consequence of poverty, one that was ignored, was the intense 
humiliation suffered by people who had been reduced to such a state. Nudity was one of 
the extent to which psychological normality had suffered in Mozambique as a result of 
the war.174 
Gaza province began to be seriously affected by conflict in the late 1983. By 1987 the 
conflict had spread to every district of the province, severely crippling the province's 
l71Cherrett, et al., Norwegian Aid and The Environment in Mozambique, p,46; and O'Keefe, 
Mozambique environmental problems, p.322. 
172Ibid., p.322. 












economy and displacing over 100,000 people from their home. The disruption of peasant 
agricultural production caused by conflict, compounded by severe drought conditions 
throughout most of this period, soon created widespread food shortages affecting a 
further 200-300,000 people. 175 
Rural-urban migration had sky-rocketed, as people continued to flee the countryside in 
search of some measure of security in the cities, greatly straining already overburdened 
urban infrastructure. In creating this situation in Gaza province, war modus operandi had 
been in keeping with the way it had operated in the other parts of the country. In terms of 
its conventional military structure, its extreme brutality towards the civilian population, 
its targeting of communal villages and socio-economic infrastructure, its reliance on 
forced recruitment, the conflict situation in southern Mozambique confirmed much was 
known about armed conflict.176 
Villages caught in the crossfire of the war lived in constant fear. Villagers could not 
travel out of their village safely, and constantly looked at each other with suspicious eyes. 
Vestiges of normality were few in rural southern Mozambique, and much cherished. 
Displaced persons who had ended up in the "reed cities" as they were called, the slums of 
the bigger cities, had the advantage of being in areas where food was at least around, 
even if they could not access it legally or properly.177 
Most of food aid in the countryside was given out not just because people were too poor 
to afford food, but because in many rural areas the food was not available. The rural 
peasant economy had long been a subsistence economy for the majority, and when the 
peasants could no longer produce their own food because they were separated from their 
land, it simply was not there to be had. 178 By this situation of the war Maputo was home 
175Roesch, Renamo and Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: a view from Gaza province: paper 
prepared for Symposium" Mozambique: Contemporary issues and Current Research, organized 
by the Refugee Studies Programme and the Standing Committee for Africa Studies, Oxford 
University 1991, p.5. 
176Ibid., p.5. 












to about 10 per cent of Mozambique's population. Not so long ago, in 1970s, only 5.7 per 
cent of the entire population lived in cities. By 1990s, almost 20 per cent of the 
population was urbanized because of the war. In 1985 when the armed contlict was at its 
k b .. . . t 53 t 179 pea ,ur amzatIon was mcreasmg a . per cen per annum. 
The key environmental problem that had to be tackled was the displacement of the rural 
population zones where the essential resources, secure land, was in scare supply and 
where a reduction in wage-earning opportunity had reduced the capacity to purchase 
farming inputs. Sustainable land use strategies had to be devised in a context of intense 
population concentration and resource scarcity.180 The other side of the equation was that 
many of the remaining peasant producers living in the interior and outside the corridors 
were cut off from resources, that state and even donors by the insecurity of travel because 
of the intensity of the armed contlict. 
Sustainable development in Mozambique in the context of armed contlict meant ensuring 
the survival of the population concentrations by enabling an intensification of production 
within a minimum of environmental deterioration. Intensification of production within a 
sustainable development approach meant improving resource management. This 
effectively meant a strategy for the urban, peri-urban zones, corridors and coastline only. 
The fundamental need in the context of armed contlict and economic collapse always 
was, however that production for immediate survival could remain the priority and a 
certain environmental cost could have to be accepted until the country returned to 
normal. 181 
In some places, where the displaced persons lived faced environmental problems because 
a major part of the villages were built on a swamp. This situation was especially found in 
the neighbourhoods of Maputo such as Mafalala, Magude and Luis Cabral; in Gaza, Xai-
179Ibid., p.99. 
180Sam Moyo, The Southern African Environment ; profiles of the SADC Countries, London 
1993, pp.196-197; and Cherrett, Norwegian Aid and the Environment in Mozambique, ppA-5. 
181Moyo, The Southern African Environment, pp.196-197; and Cherrett, Norwegian Aid and the 











Xai, and Chokwe. Drainage and sewerage were difficult and expensive, surface water 
was permanent in many places and there was a risk of waterborne disease. Confusing the 
requirement of urban drainage problem with those of irrigated agriculture was, however, 
unusual.182 There was a need to concentrate attention on coastal zone forestry, especially 
cashew production, and on the ecological interface between mangrove-shrimps-small 
fish, because many displaced persons fled into these areas, that were relatively safe 
during the war. 
Overcrowding plus malnutrition, the lot of the millions of Mozambican displaced persons 
and refugees were the breeding grounds of a tuberculosis (TB) epidemic. The level of 
prevalence ofTB could be seen as a register of the extent to which sector of the displaced 
persons had been exposed to a deteriorating environment, malnutrition, dirty water, 
inadequate sewerage and overcrowding. Thus, although control and curative operations 
were necessary, the widespread presence of the TB indicated an environmental crisis 
which needed to be changed if the disease was to be controlled among the displaced 
persons. 183 
Reproductive health suffered uniformly among the displaced persons. The incidence of 
stillbirths and complications of pregnancy and delivery were high in such population, 
during the armed conflict. The incidence and prevalence of STDs, including HIV I AIDS 
could also be expected to be high. Nevertheless, Malaria, measles, acute respiratory 
infections and diarrhoeal diseases accounted for most of the deaths among displaced 
persons.184 
Internally displaced populations were throughout southern Mozambique who suffered the 
most because national resources were even more scare than in the refugee camps where 
there had been a concentration of international efforts under the umbrella of the United 
182Vincent Keane, Health impact oflarge post-conflict migratory movement: the experience of the 
Mozambique, Maputo 1996, p.9. 
183Cherrett, Norwegian Aid and the Environment in Mozambique, pp.54-6l 
184Keane, Health impact of large post-conflict migratory movement: the experience of the 
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Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).185 The communities and regional 
administrations where the majority internally displaced populations relocated rarely had 
the capacity to handle them alone, and responsibility for the care and support of internally 
displaced populations necessarily fell to a combination of the national government and 
international bodies, such as the United Nations agencies and Non-Government 
Organizations (NGOS).186 
Civilian populations were used as a commodity in furthering strategic requirements: 
refugee populations could assist in transport and in shielding combatants, with large 
populations accompanying military movements against their will. The implication for 
carriage and transmission of a variety of chronic diseases between refugee and host 
populations was enhanced because of the disruption of established medical interventions 
and loss to follow-up.ls7 
Among refugee and internally displaced persons, infant mortality rates suggested that 
children were most seriously affected by the conflict. While all internally displaced 
persons experienced high rates of acute malnutrition, much of the child mortality increase 
was a direct of this, together with the added burden of frequent diarrhoea, acute 
respiratory infections, and vaccine preventable diseases.188 
Malaria transmission had increased in Maputo, and some places in Gaza province. The 
causes of this increase were malnutrition: overcrowding, insufficient drainage systems, 
inadequate refuse disposal, migration from endemic areas, poor education and lack of 
vector control. Populations moved to urban areas in times of armed conflict to avoid 
conflict and seek employment. Overcrowding resulted in unemployment and degradation 
of family support and values.189 















The conflict not only displaced millions of Mozambicans to ecologically sensitive areas 
in neighbouring countries and along that country's fragile coast, but also exerted 
excessive pressure on the environment, polluting those areas, decimating wildlife in 
national parks, causing widespread land degradation and disrupting environmental 
management. Products from the wild (fruits, tubers, roots, leaves, fungi, honey, fish, 
shellfish, wild animals, wood) were found to be important in all communities.190 They 
became more important in times of crisis. 
All communities declined natural resources within easy reach of their homes. A decline 
in forest around villages and fish along coast and rivers was frequent. In some areas the 
war had allowed some recovery of vegetation, however, this was often rapidly being 
cleared to re-open fields. Plants and animals growing wild were considered available to 
all without restriction. 191 Parts of Xai-Xai, some areas land was generally available under 
ternure arrangements as long as households were prepared to clear the bush, among the 
displaced persons. Among the displaced persons, competition for surface water resource 
was a problem in Massingir and Xai-Xai. 192 
Massingir is one of the 11 districts in Gaza province. It is situated on the western edge of 
the province and borders the Kruger Park of South Africa. The popUlation was estimated 
to be only 25,000 people. The war had affected the district from 1984 onwards, 
restricting people's access to their field and crop production consequently fell. 193 From 
1986 some people started to flee from outlying areas and by 1988/9 most of the 
population, with the exception of those near the lakeshore had fled their homes. The 
popUlation in the north of the district (Chimangue, Makanadzulu and other villages) 
sought refuge in South Africa, with often involved walking across the Kruger Park. 194 
190Whiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at the Village Level-Mozambique, p.14. 
191Ibid., p.14. 
192Ibid., ppA-15. 












The population in the south of district fled both to South Africa and to Massingir Sede 
with a few people also moving to places like Chokwe. The fleeing population generally 
lost all their possession and all their livestock. The refugees in South Africa generally 
made their base in Gazankulu, where they received limited relief assistance and were able 
to cultivate around their huts. From there both men and women generally found work on 
farms, fruit picking and in construction.195 
Those who fled to Massingir survived with the help of relief food and a number of 
strategies such as selling charcoal, fish, water melons, and obtained from the few more 
secure areas near the lakeshore. The villages around the lakeshore became insecure 
during the conflict but were not permanently abandoned. People fled at times and slept in 
the bush and many lost their livestock. However, people managed in a limited way to 
continue farming and fishing. 196 
As the numbers of displaced spiraled with time, so the capacity of offer the basic 
requirements of food, shelter, sanitation and protection became increasingly stressed. 
Funding was less readily available and the region and its people became more and more 
disadvantaged as conflict dragged on. Compromised individuals who had fled an 
intolerable situation frequently found themselves vulnerable, with none of the traditional 
means of coping with the rigours of survival.197 
The reversal of their fortunes was much more complex than a simple return. At end of the 
war, was a hostile environment with huge popUlation displacements and very little 
national infrastructure. The task of facilitating a safe and viable return as well as creating 
an environment in which populations thrived and grew, was a daunting on. The capacity 
of the international community to assist national bodies in the return and reintegration 
process was a most vital and difficult aspect of the peace process. 198 
19SWhiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at the Village Level-Mozambique, p 14. 
196Ibid., pp.140-141. 












At end of armed conflict there were approximately eight million displaced persons in 
Southern Mozambique: two million refugees and six million internally displaced 
populations. This represented half of the popUlation of Mozambique. It was estimated 
that six hundred thousand were killed during the armed conflict. A disproportionately 
high number of infants and children died, agricultural production fell by over 50%; 40% 
of health services infrastructure were destroyed. 199 Rural populations became inaccessible 
and health services could not be provided, resulting in dramatic increases in mortality. 
Over the course of war, no part of the country was spared, although some areas were 
more affected than others. Provinces as Inhambane (50% of internally displaced 
populations), and Gaza ( about 45,5%), were among the most seriously affected.2oo The 
combination of military strategies and human rights violations had been instrumental in 
reducing much of Mozambique's popUlation to a state of chronic famine. 
While starvation had been rare, if it had occurred at all, millions of people had endured 
miserable conditions of prolonged hunger, destitution and hopelessness. The famine, 
including suffering caused by the breakdown of public health and curative facilities, had 
cost many more lives than had been lost directly on account of the violence itself. The 
destruction of houses, cantinas and trucks, the forcible displacement of large section of 
the population, the requisitioning of food and labour, and the blocking or looting of relief 
supplies had all contributed to artificial food crisis in the country and had also contributed 
on the environmental problems. At the time, natural adversities such as drought and 
floods had played only a secondary role the calamity?OI 
While there was reliable evidence that RENAMO or FRELIMO's forces deliberately 
used starvation in order to punish or kill civilians, the creation of widespread famine was 
an inevitable and predictable consequence of their military strategies, pursued for other 
reasons. The drought of 199112 had again created widespread famine conditions, and the 
1~id.,p.12. 
2ooKaene, Health impact oflarge post-conflict migratory movements, p.12. . 












war was again preventing the provision of adequate emergency relief to the needy 
population.202 
Environmental Problems in the Coastal Zone 
The coastal zone of Mozambique stretches over 2,700 km from the Rovuma River mouth 
southwards to Ponta d'Ouro on the South African border. It contains rich ecosystems and 
considerable biodiversity and possesses enormous economic potential including tourism, 
transport, fishing and agriculture.203 Mozambique's coast can be divided into three zones: 
the northern third, stretching from Rovuma to Angoche, comprises a relatively narrow 
rock or coralline continental shelf. The central third, from Angoche to Bazaruto, is where 
the outflow of the Zambezi, Pungue and Save rivers has created a muddy or sandy shelf. 
The southern third, from Bazaruto to Ponta d'Ouro, has a rocky bottom,z04 
There are four distinct coast habitats. Enclosed bays, lagoons and estuaries provide the 
first category. These areas possess crustacean and finfish resources and also include 
coastal swamps and wetlands which serve as important breeding grounds for fish and bird 
life. Mangroves form an important barrier against coast erosion but offer a tempting 
target for the fast growing shrimp aquaculture industry. Finally, there are the atolls and 
coral reefs which in all probability have a greater potential as a tourist resource than for 
commercial fisheries.205 
The coast is a complex and fragile ecological zone that faces the most profound 
environmental problems in the country. During the conflict there were multiple demands 
upon the resource base and inevitable conflicts over resource use which act to the 
detriment of sustainable development. Approximately 100,000 people were directly or 
202Southern Africa,( Africa Watch), Peace, prospects in Mozambique, Vol.5 (10) (1992), 
Johannesburg 1992, p.12. 
203Joao Sitoe, Improving Coastal Zone Management. In: Bernardo Ferraz and Barry Munslow, 
Sustainable Development in Mozambique, Oxford 1999, pp. 124-125 .. 
2040'Keefe, Mozambique environmental problems, p.313. 











indirectly employed in different activities, as for example, fuelwood collection and 
clearance for agriculture?06 The Word Bank (l988a) argued that 40 per cent of the 
wooded area has been degraded towards scrub. Mangroves had been severely depleted 
and 70 per cent had been removed.207 Removal of trees was threatened the stability of 
coastal dunes. Urban and peri-urban areas were, however, suffering fuelwood shortages 
as a result of population concentration. In Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces there 
were firewood problems. 
Many of the soils of Inhambane and Gaza are sandy and parched. Steep slopes are a 
limitation to farming in the west, carrying a risk of soil erosion, but during war there were 
possibilities for expansion of farming both for agriculture, and for pastoral farming. With 
all these environmental problems, deforestation, soil degradation and soil erosion, 
Mozambique faced problems in areas of high population density with a vulnerable 
resource base because of conflict and natural disasters. Degradation and resource 
shortages were most severe in peri-urban areas and special environments, such as coastal 
mangroves and dunes.208 
Also people were directly or indirectly employed in the fisheries sector. Approximately 
40 per cent of the south Mozambique popUlation, were in some way dependent on the 
living aquatic resources to sustain their livelihoods. The living aquatic resources were 
common-property resources with mUltiple competing users. Conflicts of interest 
frequently arose between the different user groups, as between sporting and commercial 
fishermen. There was considerable local resentment against foreign fishermen who, under 
the cover of tourism, removed a considerable quantity of fish for commercial purposes, 
taking advantage of the weak institutional capacity for control and surveillance of all 
fishing activities?09 
2060'Keefe, Mozambique environmental problems, pp.308-311. 
207Cherrett, Norwegian Aid and the Environment, p.29. 
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Problems existed in the fishing sector, where it was necessary to: establish the size of the 
resource and catch limits; feed the people; and improve the situation of artisan fishermen 
who lacked all but the minimum resources. Finally, there was a weak institutional set-up 
in the sector. Some species such as prawns had reached or exceeded their maximum 
sustainable off-take limit, whilst there was room for a larger catch to be taken amongst 
some other species. Other problems in the coastal zone involved creating incentives and a 
framework to develop marine aquaculture, and more seriously the degradation of the 
coast and marine ecosystems.210 
New economic activities was taking place without any order or planning, and degradation 
of the coastal environment was occurring. Mangroves, sea grass beds and corals are 
essential parts of marine ecosystems. But in some areas there were being degraded 
through the use as firewood and use as industrial techniques. Mangroves occupied some 
500,000 hectares and were found in 17 different stretches of coastline, occupying some 
15 per cent of total coastline.2l1 The area under mangrove had been reduced by 70 per 
cent during the armed conflict period, largely because of cutting for firewood and 
construction. Mangroves are trees growing in the interdital zone. Such trees flourish in 
relatively protected environment, such as estuaries where fine sediment has 
accumulated.212 Problems of uncontrolled and inadequately managed tourism soon 
became apparent in the 1990s in Bilene, Ponta d'Ouro, Xai-Xai and Maputo, involving 
the unnecessary felling of trees, destruction of dunes, litter, and general degradation of 
the coastal and marine ecosystems?13 
Degradation of land operated at two levels: Firstly, in some areas there were too many 
peasant farmers trying to cultivate marginal land with inadequate management techniques 
based on traditional slash-and-burn methods. Secondly, for commercial farmers using 
irrigation systems, again inadequate land-use management techniques were being 
2IOBemardo Ferraz and Munslow Barry, National Environment Management Programme. In: 
Sustainable development in Mozambique, Oxford 1999, pp.1 03-1 04. 
21lO'Keefe, Mozambique environmental problems, p.315. 
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employed which could lead to Stalinization, alkalinization and erosion of soil.214 In areas 
of localized population concentrations, the tree resource had come under pressure. Slash-
and-bum cultivation meant that between 35% and 45% of the country's forested areas 
were estimated to be subject to annual burnings. Mangroves were particularly affected in 
some area. Finally, challenges in the coastal zone included a degradation of the water 
resource and mineral resource exploitation.215 
Negative impacts mentioned by United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 
1988, included unnecessary drainage of swamps and marshes; altered conditions for flora 
and fauna following alterations to hydrologic regimes; contamination of waters by 
herbicides and pesticides; alteration to patterns of sediment movement; spread of water-
borne diseases such as malaria, and diarrhoea diseases; incision of rivers below dams; 
high sedimentation rates in reservoirs; and explosive spread of exotic plants on 
reservoirs. These issues had not been assessed in Mozambique but were secondary to the 
impact of armed conflict?16 
The direct discharge of industrial and municipal wastes into ocean was a significant 
threat to the local coast and marine environment adjacent to the main urban centres, 
during the conflict, in particular Maputo. The environmental risks also increased 
considerable in the Matola refinering near Maputo, came into operation, both as a result 
of the operations of the plant itself and of the increase in tanker traffic in Matola Channel. 
The coastal pollution from ships had been limited. However, there was the notable 
exception of the Katina P oil tanker spilled of 1992, when about 3,000 tons of heavy fuel 
oil polluted parts of the coast around Maputo Bay.217 
2130'Keefe, Mozambique environmental problems, pp.317 -320. 
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The population pressure had a number of negative environmental effects in the coast 
zone. There was depletion of the mangroves, cleaning of vegetation cover more 
generally, increased river sedimentation, and erosion, and some traditional agricultural 
practices such as burning reduced soil fertility. Mangrove destruction caused reduced 
coastal protection. Mozambique is one of the countries at risk from rising sea water levels 
as a result of global warming, with extensive low-lying coastal plains subject to storms 
and extremely high tidal rises.218 
The majority of the coast is of the soft type, vulnerable erosion. Shifting cultivation led to 
deforestation and destabilized sand dunes, increasing the risks of dune encroachment 
along the coastline. Inadequate management of dams exacerbated the problems, along 
with inadequate management of mining activities.219 Further causes of coastal erosion 
included the practice of agricultural on marginal land and allowing four-wheel-drive cars 
on beaches or dunes: the erosion occurred mainly on the steeps of the laves western 
Maputo and Gaza, areas that were of the intense refugee settlement.220 
Population concentration, particularly in the principal urban centres, and intensive 
economic activities as consequence of the conflict created serious problems of conflicting 
demands upon the natural resource base of the coastal zone. People settled in these 
environmentally sensitive areas to escape from the war in the interior and to avail 
themselves of the limited services, Commercialization and aid disbursement networks 
available. A particular problem that concerned it was deforestation along coastal zone, 
including destruction of the mangroves. Livelihood-sustaining activities and economic 
development more generally in agriculture, industry and settlement were having a 
negative effect on the coastal and marine environments. In the coastal cities, urban and 
industrial pollution of the bays was a growing problem.221 
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During the war degradation of sanitation systems and low quality of drinking water were 
the critical environmental issues in the urban areas. Specifically this entailed: deficient 
and obsolete sanitation systems; population pressure and demand in excess of the 
system's capacity; poor usage and maintenance of the system; and lack of finance from 
Municipal Councils.222 Hence water pipes burst, stagnant and polluted pools of water 
form, surface and subterranean pollution of water occurred and these flowed into the sea 
and rivers. Lack of drainage systems in the suburbs of cities and in small and medium-
sized towns contributed to the contamination of the urban environmental and the spread 
of disease.223 
People were forced to used waste water for their domestic needs. Many of the population 
did not had access to a toilet and defecated in the open air, others used toilets incorrectly. 
This was a serious problem in some cities as for example in Maputo, Xefina and Inhaca 
islands and some places ofthe Matola?24 The population concentration in some areas was 
not only because of the conflict. Also the postcolonial State had generally been less 
tolerant of the forms of organization specific to subordinate social groups unpopulated 
urban areas, because of the wrong understanding of the word "poder popular" (popular 
power).225 
Industrial waste also was a problem in Maputo and Matola in this period of conflict. The 
Texlom factory in Maputo used 1,000 tons of caustic soda a month plus other chemicals. 
The treatment of residues were inadequate, with a high alkaline content discharged into 
Matola River and sea. Municipal waste was a more widespread problem. Only Maputo 
had a water treatment process for waste water, but it did not operate efficiently. Strong 
indications of faecal contamination existed in the Bay of Maputo, due the concentration 
of the displaced persons. None of the nine main ports had facilities to receive, store and 
treat shipping wastes, nor to deal with any emergency.226 
222Ferraz and Munslow, National Environmental Management Programme, p.105; and Ximena 
Andrade, Families in a changing environment in Mozambique, Maputo 1987, pp. 95-110. 
223 Andrade, Families in a changing environment in Mozambique, pp.95-11 O. 
224 Ibid., pp.95-110. 
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Also environmental education sector, during armed conflict was required in 
Mozambique. But in formal education sector, there was not environmental education. 
Between 1983 and 1992; 3,402 out of 5,886 schools were either closed or destroyed. The 
closure of schools plus the increase in popUlation had put the educational system under 
great stress. That was in the context of poor national indices for literacy and unacceptably 
low educational level for the popUlation as a whole?27 
There was no coherent, all-encompassing approach to environmental education in the 
system. In the no-formal sector, problems included: the lack of a government policy to 
stimulate environmental education; environmental issues did not command the public's 
attention to the required and were scarcely considered; a high level of illiteracy meant 
teaching methods had to be adapted to people's culture and traditions. All these 
educational problems, also contributed in the environmental problems in coastal zone?28 
Moreover, there was weak institutional capacity for the rational management of the 
natural resource base. Only the 1990 Constitution was for the first time explicit in 
relation to the environment. Not until the 1990s did the government begin to develop an 
institutional capacity for environment management. That still remained weak and needed 
support into the medium to long term. The government took further steps to develop its 
policy framework with its production of the national report to Rio Earth summit of 
1992.229 
Thus, a National Environment Commission (CAN) was set up in 1992 and a Ministry for 
the Co-ordination of Environmental Action(MICOA) at the end of 1994, yet still in the 
final yea5s of the 1990s it remained unclear how well top-level inter-sectorial co-
ordination would operate, not only at the level of government ministries, but in the 
227Ibid., p.104 












increasingly important arena of the interface between state institutions, the private sector 
and Non- governmental organizations.23o 
Deforestation, Soil Degradation and Soil Erosion 
This section begins by examining the very particular and grave deforestation, soil 
degradation and soil erosion situation during the war that was identified by Phil O'Keefe, 
World Bank 1988a, and UNEP 1988, as the main environmental problem in southern 
Mozambique. These institutions, had also identified the deforestation as the main 
environmental issue with logging, fuelwood collection and clearance for agriculture 
identified as the major causes.231 The environmental functions and services of the forest 
ecosystem were reduced or even lost, depending on the extent of deforestation. 
Forests protect the soils from the tropical rainfall and its effects on erosion. But in 
southern Mozambique, during the war, deforestation increased soil erosion, especially in 
the coastal zones of the Gaza( Xai-Xai, Bilene, Chokwe, Chibuto and Guija districts), 
Maputo ( Magude, Inhaca and Xefina islands, Costa do Sol, Moamba, Manhi9a, and 
Namaacha districts), and Inhambane (Mabote, Vilanculos, Tome and Funhalour districts) 
where the high concentration of people living within 50 kilometres of the coastal ( an 
estimated 50 per cent), increased the real population density.232 
The conflict provoked the assimilation of new behaviours and attitudes in relation to 
natural resources and caused weak cohesion and solidarity among people. The sacred 
places were violated in reach of fuelwood and there was dislocation of people from their 
areas of origin. These people found themselves in situations of extreme poverty. This 
situation obliged them, to survive, to collect out from the nature all what could be 
230Ibid., pp.99-1 03. 












immediately marketed used?33 They cut mangroves. and other protected trees for 
fuelwood or charcoal production. 
Some of the worst deforestation, soil degradation and erosion had occurred in the three 
southern provinces due the population concentration in zones that were considered 
relative safely. Thus deforestation also changed the proportion of the incident light of the 
land surface in the region. For example, more particular mangroves had been several 
depleted at the time. 234 
Deforestation and other unsustainable use of marginal lands had left in the southern 
Mozambique in wasteland increased losses form flooding, and reduced dry season river 
flows, thus, probability could cause salinization of coastal agricultural lands. Rural 
people were particularly dependent on forests for meeting part of their basic needs such 
as fuelwood, and land clearance. Millions of rural people lived on incomes below the 
minimum on which they could be expected to survive, because their direct access to 
subsistence goods harvested from natural allowed them to survive on their current 
incomes.235 
Deforestation was pushing them to the edge of survival driving environmental refugees 
into city slums. Loss the forest was also leading to the disruption of traditional 
occupations and greater impoverishment. The number of people in southern Mozambique 
that lived under marginalized conditions had risen dramatically in this period (1980-
1992)?36 In 1986 30% of the population did not have an adequate dietary energy supply. 
In a number of the south of Mozambique one of the main reasons for this was soil 
erosion, and yet technocratic and official policies had demonstrated little if any progress 
2331. Lopes, Pressao populacional na zona Costeira-Mito ou Facto? In: D. Dias, et alii, (eds). 
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pp.22-25; and 1.M. Mafalacusser, The use of indigenous knowledge for Land use Planning in a 
part of Xai-Xai District. Gaza province. Mozambique. International Institute for Aerospace 
Survey and Earth Science. Enschede, The Netherland 1995, p.135. 
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at all towards addressing the problem. This was despite the fact that conservation 
technicians in this field had realized that much of the technical knowledge necessary to 
solve the problem of soil erosion had been not available.237 
Nevertheless, in several cases crop failure previously attributed to drought was known to 
be due in large measure tom soil erosion. Erosion degraded land and reduced moisture 
retention capacity, such that minor droughts which would once had caused tolerable falls 
in yield could result in catastrophic declines in agricultural production, followed by 
famine, social collapse and even war. At farm level, the risk of total crop failure was 
greatly enhanced as land became degraded by soilloss,z38 
With all three environmental problems, deforestation, soil degradation and soil erosion, 
Mozambique faced problems in areas of high population density, in coastal zones, about 
50 people per sqkm.239 Degradation and resource shortage were most severe in peri-urban 
areas because of the concentration of the displaced persons; and deforestation was severe 
along the coast and around the capital Maputo,z4o Severe deforestation had also occurred 
due the influx of the displaced persons in some areas such as in urban, peri-urban and 
coastal zones between 1981 to 1990s without control. Nevertheless, the World Bank 
calculated that 40 per cent of the wooded area had been degraded towards scrub during 
the conflict, in Gaza and Maputo provinces between in 1987-1988.241 
Around some villages of Maputo, as for example, in Namaacha, Boane, Moamba; and in 
Gaza, Massingir, Chicualacuala and Chokwe districts, women traveled long distances in a 
search for fuelwood in the 1980s. Thus removal of trees threatened the stability of fragile 
zones in these places. 242 Charcoal played and continues to play an important role in some 
urban places, during and after the armed conflict. In the inland of Maputo, fuelwood was 
237Ibid.,p.239. 
238Ibid.,p.239. 
239Mafalacusser, The use of Indigenous knowledge for land use planning in a part of Xai-Xai 
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transported by women in the head, and by private traders using lorries or vans between 
50-60 kilometres to suburbs to the capital city for sale and domestic use. 243 However, the 
conflict was responsible for destruction of traditional systems of natural source 
management including common property rights 
In southern Mozambique, there had been traditional forms of natural resources 
management based on common property rights. The example included: (1) exploitation of 
mussels; (2) salt extraction; (3) fishing in lagoons and use of traditional water sources; (4) 
common use of sacred areas; (5) common use of rangelands; (6) common use of 
medicinal plants and some wild fruits; (7) common use of miombo forest for mushroom 
collection, and (8) common use of forest for various other wood and non-wood forest 
products. These modus vivendi of the populations were altered in the period of the 
conflict. 244 
Nevertheless, the generic term "deforestation" is used so ambiguously that it is virtually 
meaningless as a description of land-use change?45 However, for southern Mozambique, 
it had been used at time to refer to any or all of the following activities with respect to 
existing forest: fuel wood cutting; commercial logging, shifting cultivation; forest 
clearing for conversion to continuous annual cropping, to grazing, to food, beverage or 
industrial tree crops; and finally where burning had produced a degraded forest or 
savannah.246 
Therefore, rural fuelwood collection contributed to deforestation, because rural house 
consumption constituted more than 50 per cent of total household domestic fuel wood use 
in southern Mozambique, in this period 1980 to 1992. Estimates of deforestation caused 
by fuelwood consumption assumed that all the wood and charcoal used in urban areas 
243Mafalacussr, The use of Indigenous knowledge for land use planning in a part of Xai-Xai 
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came from areas cleared primarily to harvest wood.247 But in accessible areas the forest 
biomass cleared during land preparation for cultivation was sold or converted to charcoal 
for sale in urban areas. 
However, harvesters therefore did not desertify the lands from which they extracted 
urban energy supplies and the fact that such deforested lands might later be abused by 
uncontrolled bush burning which retard forest regeneration had little to do with the 
provision of fuelwood to urban areas. The consumption for forestland had also 
contributed the soil deterioration. And the predominant role of agriculture in reducing 
forest cover was similar in the other southern Mozambique areas.248 
At the time, most fuelwood came not only from cutting live trees for fuel, but from 
surplus wood left over from clearing land for agriculture, or from lopping branches of 
trees standing on farms that were valued for many other purposes besides fuel supply 
(e.g. shade, fruit, or building poles). There was not just one, very big problem of energy 
supply, but many smaller problems of command over trees and their products to meet a 
wide range of basic needs, including food, shelter, income and investment. Since these 
problems took different forms for different popUlations in different places, the range of 
potential solutions was equally diverse. 249 These problems influenced the major concerns 
in contemporary environment and development debates in Mozambique, including 
deforestation, range land degradation, soil erosion and the depletion of wildlife 
biodiversity. 
The land resource, despite the seasonally of rainfall, is generally favourable to farming, 
though the effects of droughts, such as that of 1983-84 and the less severe one of 1988 
which affected much of the coastal zone.250 Soil vary considerably, in relation to 
topographic location and mineral content. The soils of the north of Inhambane, and Gaza 
247Ibid., p.135. 
248Ibid.,. p.135. 
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in Xai-Xai and Bilene-Macia districts (coastal zones), are sandy and parched. Steep 
slopes are a limitation to farming in the west of these two provinces, carrying a risk of 
soil erosion.251 
During the armed conflict and due the population concentration in these coastline areas, 
there were expansion of farming for agriculture. State farms were much more than private 
and peasants farms, in the Baixo Limpopo (for example, CAlL and Chilembene) and they 
depended on inputs of fertilizer, seed, pesticides and machinery and hired labour.252 
In 1987, there were some state farms in Baixo Limpopo, such as CAlL and Chilembene 
enterprises, which were involved in monoculture of rice, entailing a higher risk of soil 
erosion. Technically these farms were inefficient. The prevention of erosion on cultivated 
land depends essentially on the reduction of soil detachment and the velocity of run-off, 
and on grazing land on the maintenance of adequate vegetative ground cover.253 But in 
the time of conflict, in southern Mozambique, arable land management was through 
shifting cultivation, and bush reduction by burning of grass, from 1980s to 1990s.254 
Though erosion was not a generalized problem, in the coastal zones of the three southern 
Mozambique provinces, however, there were a number of sites where erosion was a 
serious issue. On the steep slopes of the lavas of the western Maputo (Namaacha, Boane, 
and Moamba districts); and in Gaza, Xai-Xai and BUene-Macia districts), erosion risk 
was high. In these places, soil conditions were likely to generate in areas where 
populations had fled but deteriorated in areas of population concentration,zss 
Nevertheless, the family sector needed land not only for cultivation and fallow, but also 
251Ibid., pp.18-l9. 
252Ibid., pp. 1 8-20 
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for grazing, firewood, construction timber, and medicinal plants. The importance of these 
products, usually were obtained from common land.256 
Agricultural land use, in the marginal lands had altered significantly, largely In 
accordance with changes in farm-household organization and the social relations of 
production in the context of shifts in wider political and economic structure. The cases of 
the coastal zones exemplified many of the factors implicated in these changes, but these 
had operated in different ways in different places. As different farming modes had 
particular impact on vegetation, changes in their balance played a part in patterns of 
vegetation change. The increases in intensive swamp forest and fallow had been 
permanently cleared for frequent, ---often annual---cassava or rice cropping.257 
Therefore, in southern Mozambique where livestock were important both for traditional 
and commercial farmers, and overstocking had frequently been cited as major causes of 
denudation, desiccation and erosion in the 1980s. So growing population in some areas a 
result of the war, contributed to environmental problems.258 Therefore, there was little 
evidence of the severe natural degradation, rather it occurred in locally specific sites. 
Famine, malnutrition and population movements were, however, directly related to the 
impact of war, not to nature. 
The Impact of the Armed Conflict on Wildlife and Wildlife Reserves 
Mozambique is one ofthe Southern African countries with rich wildlife potential, both in 
quantity and in the diversity of species.259 This potential was used in various ways. It was 
after independence by the National Forestry and Wildlife Directorate (DNFFB), whose 
256Whiteside, Perspectives on the Effects of Conflict at the Village Level-Mozambique, pp.23-
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task is the correct odd, that is, exploitation and protection of animals. With the spread of 
the armed conflict, in southern Mozambique, from in the 1980s, the situation worsened 
and there was destruction of important resources, such as elephant population, leopards, 
Zebra and some medicinal plants, etc., set aside for wildlife protection.26o 
The use destructive of wildlife resources by commercial poachers and Renamo, during 
the conflict, on the part of poachers seeking trophies and skins was a major contribution 
to decimation of protected species such as elephants, and rhinoceros. Also the black 
rhinoceros and antelopes were too sweeping?61 The sad reality was that the wildlife 
populations had been dramatically reduced, and that the environments in which they 
occurred were badly neglected during the years of armed conflict. Thus, the 
unsustainable-and often-illegal use of these resources was leading to their rapid 
depletion.262 
Management of natural resources in these parks and reserves had been impossible, 
because the conflict had made wildlife areas inaccessible to control, and thus had caused 
widespread destruction of the wildlife population. The conflict not only displaced 
100,000 of Mozambicans in southern Mozambique to ecologically sensitive areas in 
neighbouring countries and along that country's fragile coast, from 1980s to 1990s, but 
also exerted excessive pressure on the environment, decimating wildlife parks and 
reserves, causing widespread and disrupting environmental management.263 National 
parks and protected areas play a key role in preserving the biological diversity of 
woodland and forest areas. Because with these elements, there is nature balance, avoiding 
thus, the environmental degradation. Deforestation results in loss of biodiversity. And 
biodiversity can be protected only if rural poverty is alleviated. There are examples of 
land-hungry people encroaching on wildlife conservation in many parts of the southern 
Mozambique. Therefore, Mozambique'S protected areas had been affected during the 
Moyambique Bureau de Infonnaltao Publica, Environment: Mozambique, Maputo 1993, 
( unpagiatned). 













conflict?64 For example, the size of Maputo reserve was reduced three times in 15 years, 
because of people moving into the area. In reality, even prior to the conflict, southern 
Mozambique parks and wildlife reserves had a permanent population of settlers.265 As the 
conflict progressed, more people moved into these places by fear, because both sides, 
(FRELIMO and RENAMO), looked for to control major number of populations. 
During the conflict there were migrations of populations from one rural area to another, 
especially to the reserves or to the parks, where they found a relative security and bush 
meat. Because in some parks or reserves there were FRELIMO or RENAMO's military 
bases. This situation provoked serious environmental problems on the wildlife?66 
For example, the majority of the persons who had to flee from attacks of RENAMO or 
FRELIMO's forces in the communal villages of3 de Fevereiro in the Manhic;a district, in 
Maputo province; and Massingir and Eduardo Mondlane districts, in Gaza province, in 
1984, did not move to cities, but to the other rural areas.267 Therefore, it can consider that 
during the conflict there were two tendencies of the rural population: the tendency to 
migrate to urban and peri-urban areas, but also the much more widespread tendency to 
remain in the rural areas, even under extreme difficult conditions. 
The principal parks and reserves of the south of Mozambique are: Banhine park in Gaza 
province (7,000 square kilometres); Zinhave park in Inhambane province (3,700 square 
kilometres), and Bazaruto park, offshore from Inhambane province (150 square 
kilometres), Pomene Reserve in Inhambane province (200 square kilometres)?68 And 
Maputo Elephant Reserve in Maputo province (700 square kilometers). It spreads from 
the southern tip of Inhaca island to the country's southern border with South Africa. The 
terrain is distinctive in that it covers a wide spectrum of habitats, from rolling grass plans 
263Ian Michler, This is Mozambique, London 1999, p.32. 















scattered with patches of sand coastal dune forest to lagoons, swampy marshland and 
length stretch of untouched coastline.269 
This territory was once ranged by large herds of elephant and plains game, as well as 
numerous predator species, but the reserve experienced steep declines in its animal 
popUlations due to extensive poaching and the effects of the conflict. The elephant 
population decreased during the conflict, but 180 animals remained until in 1992.270 
Crocodile, hippo and a variety of smaller creatures, such as side-striped jackal, were the 
only species that survived the slaughter. This situation had been provoked, mainly as a 
result of poaching both by RENAMO and FRELIMO's forces?71 
The thirteen controlled hunting areas, known as Coutadas, range in size from just over 
1,000 square kilometers to the largest, Coutada 16, at 10,000 square kilometres between 
the Elefantes and Limpopo Rivers covering part of Massingir and Chicualacuala districts 
(24,888 square kilometres) and is localized along the border with south Africa's Kruger 
National Park.272 Although no figures are available, many of the large animals in Coutada 
16 were killed during the war. Although hunting had been controlled in the area for many 
years, in the time of the conflict, small scale subsistence hunting by the local populations 
had continued?73 
The local popUlation needed access to the Coutada for field, grazing, gathering wild 
foods and ideally for subsistence hunting. Also the local population needed access to the 
Coutada because in the Coutada there were a wide variety of plant species that were used 
for medicinal purposes, construction of houses, domestic utensils, firewood and charcoal. 
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And some wild fruits that existed in the Coutada were as dietary supplements, among the 
populations, especially during periods of hunger274 The country has seventeen forest 
reserves totaling an area of about 4,500 square kilometres the majority localized in the 
province of Maputo, and Gaza only had one forest reserve.275 
The indiscriminate slaughter of wild animals by armed conflict in Mozambique's national 
parks and game reserves had led to a decline in the country's elephant popUlation from 
54,800 in 1979 to an estimated 16,600 in 1988?76 The decline in the elephant population 
was alarming. The greatest slaughter took place in the period 1985-1990 when 
Mozambique lost between 20-70 per cent of its elephants.277 
During the armed conflict, illegal ivory trading was a major source of income for 
RENAMO. RENAMO passed ivory South Africa Defence Force, in exchange for 
weapons, ammunition, other supplies or money?78 Matutuine's pre-armed conflict, in 
Maputo province, elephant population of 350 was depleted during the conflict to an 
estimated 30-55 head, along with population of rhino, hippo and other animals.279 
South of the Elephants River, in southern Mozambique region, great swaths of stunted 
knob-thorn and marula-tree savannah spread east as far as the foot-hills of Mozambique's 
Lebombo Mountain. These hot, scrubby plains were the grazing grounds of zebras, 
wildebeests, and impalas, as well as their hungry predators: leopards, cheetahs, wild 
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dogs, and lions. In fact, these mammals were decimated when the armed conflict spread 
all southern Mozambique in 1982/3.280 
Natural disasters, Drought and Floods, and their Influence on Public 
Health 
Mozambique, since gaining its independence in 1975, had been forced to concentrate its 
limited material and human resources on the defense and survival of its population. The 
decade-long armed conflict of attrition waged by RENAMO had targeted the economic 
and social infrastructure of the country with a view to paralyzing its productive capacity 
and that of its people. As a result of this situation, Mozambique had become dependent 
on external aid for 90 per cent of its market and relief cereal needs.281 
The country's per capita income level, estimated at $US150, was among the lowest in the 
world. Studies that the UNICEF did, they showed that infant mortality was the second 
highest in the world, with one out of every three children dying before reaching the age 
of five. And these studies revealed that 90 per cent of the popUlation was living below the 
poverty level, with 60 per cent of that number living in absolute poverty.282 
By late 1986 the combined impact of armed conflict and natural disasters resulted in a 
situation where 3.2 million Mozambican peasants had been displaced or otherwise 
affected. Facing the combined impact of prolonged drought and floods, cyclones and war, 
government realized it no longer had sufficient resources to provide the food and other 
basic commodities necessary to avert widespread starvation.283 
Thus, the first international appeal for emergency assistance for Mozambique was 
launched at Geneva in February 1987. Over $US 330 million were pledged by the donor 
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community, including the monetary equivalent of 755, 100 tons of food aid?84 Because of 
the country's widespread food shortages, this aid was necessary to meet the needs not 
only of the totally destitute displaced and severely affected families in the rural areas who 
received free food but also the rural wage earners and urban dwellers who purchased the 
food at subsidized prices through the market distribution system.285 
By mid-eighties, the emergency took on additional dimensions as the impact of the 
conflict overwhelmed events. The Mozambican government recognized that it required 
more and more relief aid, as the number of internally displaced persons, affected rural 
popUlations and Mozambicans seeking security as refugees in neighbouring countries 
increased. These massive population movements pushed the country to a protracted 
complex emergency, primarily provoked by conflict, and second provoked by natural 
disasters ( drought, floods and cyclones).286 RENAMO's attacks had devastated 
Mozambique's economy bringing agricultural production a standstill, and forcing the 
internal and external migration of close to one quarter of the total population that lived in 
southern Mozambique.287 
Intermittent drought and the intensification of war in the mid-eighties, necessitated the 
setting up of the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations (OEOA) in Southern 
Mozambique in 1984.Until 1987, the emergency in Mozambique was defined as being 
caused in large part by natural disasters Le. drought, floods and cyclones.288 
For example, in the Matutuine district, in Maputo, local communities remaining with 
RENAMO were small in size and had little significant surplus grain in the wake of the 
droughts of the early eighties, the destruction wreaked by "Cyclone Demoina" in 1984 
and subsequent droughts on January 28, 29, 1984. The Cyclone Demoina struck the 
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Southern parts of Mozambique, resulting in several storms and floods.289 More than 100 
persons were killed, 9,500 families lost all their belongings, some 70,000 families lost 
their harvests and irrigation systems, roads, bridges, electricity supply lines, buildings 
and other infrastructure were destroyed.29o The total material damage caused by Demoina 
was estimated at around $US75 million. Two weeks later the Ministry of Agriculture 
presented a programme for the rehabilitation of damaged projects within the second 
Mozambique Nordic Agriculture Programme (MONAP), amounting to $US 1,650,000.291 
The estimates had been made by project staff, instructed by the MONAP co-ordination 
unit to plan the rehabilitation of projects to the same level of activity that each project had 
achieved before the cyclone. This goal also became the objective of the subsequent 
rehabilitation programmes.292 
Southern Mozambique has always had to cope with great variations in the natural 
environment. The droughts of 1981-1983 provoked migrants moving through the districts 
of Matutuine and Namaacha. This fact could be identified in two waves of out migration. 
The first was a relatively small movement provoked by drought and the second was a full 
scale exodus accompanying the first attacks of the RENAMO's forces.293 
Mozambique is rich in natural resources. The agricultural potential is among the highest 
in Africa, but the people inherited an underdeveloped economy. The people are extremely 
vulnerable, and even disturbances can lead to disaster situations. Natural hazards are 
typical phenomena which have led to emergency situations. It was estimated that the 
drought in southern Mozambique in 1982-83 caused about 100,000 deaths.294 
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Western donors did very little during these drought years to assist the affected people. In 
part this could be explained by reluctance of the West to give support to a staunch 
Marxist regime. It was probably equally true that because Western donors then primarily 
directed their efforts to disaster relief programmes in the Sahel region, particularly in 
Ethiopia, and the effects of the Mozambican drought were not appreciated.295 
The drought and famine of 1983 crippled the country. Faced with this dire situation and 
the reality of a failed Socialist experiment, FRELIMO opened Mozambique to the West 
in return for Western aid.296 When Mozambique joined the World bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and had signed an agreement with South Africa in 1984, Western aid to 
Mozambique had increased substantially. Mounting economic difficulties, armed attacks 
on economic targets and people, and natural hazards had shattered the economy and left a 
greater part ofthe Mozambican population subject to an imminent threat of starvation.297 
However, Mozambique has been faced a regular cycle of droughts and floods: Between 
1976-1978 there were floods. All major rivers were affected, causing deaths and great 
damage. The Limpopo River floods in 1977 were the most worst on record; at least 300 
people died, and 400,000 were affected. ,298 
Severe flooding which hit the Baixo Limpopo in early 1977, right at the time of the Third 
Congress, greatly facilitated government attempts to promote the formation and 
occupation of communal villages in the area. Though the floods compounded the 
difficulties of the co-operative and state farm sectors, the massive popular dislocations 
caused by floods made it easier for the government to persuade people in communal 
villages on the high ground above the Limpopo flood plain, without to observer the 
294Ibid.,p.5. 
295Ib'd 5 1 ., p .. 
296Mary Fitzpatrick, Mozambigue, 1 st ed., London 2000, p.IS; and Frances Christie and Hanlon, 
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000, Oxford 2001, pp.IO-l1. 
297 Alberts and Eduards, Drought and Destabilization, pp.S-7. 











environmental conditions?99 As a result of stepped up mobilization and a rapidly 
implemented programme of permanent resettlement of the displaced population, 18 
communal villages had been created in the Baixo Limpopo by the end of 1978, housing 
approximately 80,000 people, or just under half the rural population of the area.300 
In keeping with the directives issued by the Third Congress, government authorities also 
instituted a global planning process for agricultural production through out the province, 
beginning with the 1977-1978 agricultural campaign. Peasant and private sector 
agriculture, however, were assigned only a minimal role in the plans which were made.301 
As a consequence of the floods of 1977 and droughts of 1981-1984 the worst droughts in 
Southern Africa killed 100,000 Mozambican, and affected 4.5 million others. Since in 
1977 agricultural production decreased to alarmingly low levels as a consequence of the 
floods armed conflict, unfavourable climatic conditions, the adoption of inadequate 
policies and general world situation, forcing the popUlation to depend on external aid.302 
The natural disasters and the conflict not only destroyed the socio-economic 
infrastructure, but also forced an important part of the Mozambican population to become 
displaced persons or refugees, thus limiting the expansion of the health programmes. 
And the droughts of 1991-1992/3, Mozambique News Agency (Agencia de Informac;ao 
de Moc;ambique-AIM) warned that the drought of that years had pushed Mozambique to 
the brink of a major famine, which could be worse than of 1983. Food shortages in rural 
areas of Mozambique were so serious that RENAMO could not get food for its guerrillas, 
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pushing it towards a peace settlement.303 The drought broke in 1993, but resumed in 
south of Mozambique during the following season. The Limpopo River had all but dried 
up, leaving the river valley in Chokwe district, considered a granary under normal 
circumstances, completely parched and resembling a football field.304 
Other consequences of the floods of 1977 and droughts of 1981-1984, in 1992 the 
locality of Inhamissa of the southern province of Gaza was no longer inhabited only by 
its pre-I977 population. The combination of the natural disasters with FRELIMO's plan 
of socialization of the countryside and the armed conflict shaped the demographic picture 
in Inhamissa.305 In attempt to clarifY the social and political environment in Inhamissa at 
that time, the conflict and famine led to significant emotional and ethical problems. It was 
clear that people were seriously preoccupied with the challenge of the instability of the 
economy and their lack of security. 
The combination of droughts and war and their negative influence on FRELIMO's 
attempts at socializing agriculture generally seemed to have undermined people's 
capacity to read the colonial period. Their current unfortunate and difficult economy 
situation gave rise to very positive memories of the past. People apparently considered 
the colonial period as having had more to offer than the post-colonial era.306 Clinging to 
past memories seemed to be a reflection of their lack of positive hope for the present and 
future. Their reading of the past was a reflection of the pressure of armed conflict and 
famine. 
The Lipompo's floods and the prolonged war between the FRELIMO government and 
RENAMO, as well as drought in 1980s, contributed to the failure of the communal 
villages, state farms and agricultural co-operatives to attract and stabilize male labour in 
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the Limpopo valley, and pushed peasants towards new survival strategies mainly in Xai-
Xai city and its surrounding area.307 Also there were other several reasons for 
deterioration in agriculture. The lack rainfall and other natural disasters such as floods of 
1977, prevented normal agricultural production in the first years after independence. 
Under these unfavourable conditions agriculture was no longer main economic support. 
Thus, drought, floods and armed conflict increased the migration of Mozambicans into 
South Africa and Swaziland.308 In this period, in Inhamissa agriculture collapsed due 
natural disasters such as drought and floods, but mainly due the lack of technical 
assistance in terms of the regular cleaning of drainage and irrigation channels and 
provision of improved seeds. Rural trade seemed to have collapsed as a consequence of 
the flight from the country of the Portuguese Shopkeepers who had virtually monopolized 
the rural trade. In that period Mozambicans were unable to replace them because they 
lacked the finances and trade. And from the 1980s the armed conflict worsened the 
situation.309 
Large areas of the countryside soon became dangerous for the movement of both military 
and civilians. The spread of violence conflict disrupted agricultural production and drove 
many rural dwellers into the principal cities of Maputo, Xai-Xai, Inhambane, Maxixe, 
and Chokwe. The onset of drought between 1982 and 1984 accelerated a mounting 
shortage of food. In the 1983/84 growing season, a famine in Gaza and Inhambane 
provinces killed tens of thousands of people.310 In addition to conflict and natural 
disasters, the movement of people, including repatriated refugees and displaced people, 
disrupted productive activities and the satisfaction of basic needs. The structural 




310AIcinda Abreu, Strengthening Human Resources Capacity for Community-Based Sustainable 
Development. In: Ferraz and Munslow, Sustainable Development in Mozambique, p.140; and 











adjustment measures had helped make the situation worse because of the rapid and steep 
had rose in the price of basic products and other goods and the lying offworkers.311 
At the same time, the deterioration of basic services such as health, water supply, 
education and housing had serious consequences for human capital and social welfare. 
The drought was also causing people to move from the interior towards the coastal areas 
and towards government controlled centres. The situation was noted along the Limpopo 
Corridor.312 In 1992 to assess the drought situation confirmed that almost total loss of the 
main cereal crops in the South of country, and substantial amounts of extra food aid was 
needed. The drinking water supply was several affected. Perennial rivers and wells were 
drying up and the water table was becoming precariously low in many areas. At the time, 
there were long queues for water, putting heavy pressure on existing wells and piped 
water supply systems.313 
There was clear evidence that ground-water levels were dropping and water sources were 
drying up or becoming saline. The drought had struck against a background of armed 
conflict in which secure access to the rural areas was limited, thereby preventing 
adequate supplies from reaching the affected population.314 Ambushes and attacks relief 
convoys only magnified the disaster. An estimated 100 thousands people died in the 
several drought in southern Mozambique from 1982 to 1984, mainly because relief 
efforts were hampered by RENAMO attacks. The government was therefore faced with 
the challenge of securing the efficient management, handling, distribution and protection 
of food aid, if widespread famine to be averted.315 
The February 1977 devastating floods in the Limpopo River valley left several hundred 
thousand peasants homeless and resulted in the loss of large quantities of food crops. 
Irrigation works, granaries, houses, roads and other transport infrastructure were 
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destroyed. Drought and floods which had always occurred in Mozambique, strained the 
Mozambican economy further and mass starvation could occur at regular intervals. Large 
scale migration was one response to such disaster situations and there were signs that 
many people were leaving the country.316 
Other impacts of natural disasters were; the fact that some areas were drought-prone; 
hunger/food insecurity was the most import risk facing the community; lack of safe and 
accessible water as well as essential medicines were perceived as key vulnerabilities by 
the communities.317 Drought and floods contributed towards Mozambique's economic 
and social decline, along with the destruction of the economic and social infrastructure, 
the mass movement of the population, the mutilation of thousands of people, the 
disruption of the system of social value, unemployment, low rates of education and a 
range of diseases which raised the infant and maternal mortality rates.318 As result of this 
situation some population suffered extreme poverty. Malnutrition affected large numbers 
of families in both the urban and rural areas of southern Mozambique 
The key environmental problem that had been seen was the displacement of the rural 
population to zones where the essential resource, secure land, was in scarce supply and 
where a reduction in wage earning opportunity had reduced the capacity to purchase 
farming inputs. Sustainable land use strategies had been devised in a context of intense 
population concentration and resource scarcity. The other side of the equation was that 
many of the remaining peasant producers living in the interior and outside of the 
corridors were cut off from resources, because of the intensity ofwar.319 
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The armed conflict began in 1977 and lasted until the signing of the Rome Agreement in 
1992, coupled with severe droughts and floods, took the country into an emergency 
situation. In addition to provoking massive and on-going population movements inside 
the country and across its borders, the conflict caused tremendous devastation in the form 
of huge populations increases in the urban, peer-urban and in the coastal areas, the virtual 
extinction of many species through poaching the disappearance of forest, a shortage of 
firewood and depletion of water resources.320 
Within this context of conflict and natural disasters, from the 1980s onwards 
Mozambique implemented an Emergency Programme, the Humanitarian Assistance 
Programme. The conflict and natural disasters forced it to apply its limited resources to 
the more immediate and urgent concerns within the emergency Programme.321 
Subsequently, the programme was reoriented to respond to the impact of a prolonged 
war. Six years later, in spite of the efforts of the government and the support of the 
international community, the country still faced a critical emergency situation in which 
the lives of millions people were endangered, particularly in Southern Mozambique.322 
Although there were sporadic drought problems, the primarily cause of the emergency 
situation was the conflict situation which had caused appalling devastation and loss of 
life. The volatile and unpredictable security situation had led to a continuous process of 
population movements within the country and across national boundaries. The droughts, 
floods and conflict had disrupted the administrative, social and infrastructure, thus 
severely constraining limited capacity of government to respond to the emergency in an 
effective and timely manner. And the constant movement of populations had also 
disrupted traditional patterns and structures for coping with hardship.323 
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In order to deal with an emergency situation of such magnitude, the government of 
Mozambique had taken measures aimed at improving emergency management. These 
included the strengthening of the Coordinating Council for the Prevention and Combat of 
Natural Disasters (CCPCCN), the body responsible for the overall policy, strategy and 
management of the Emergency Programme. The CCPCCN had been placed under the 
chairmanship of Prime Minister Mario Machungo.324 
The Coordinating Council was composed of 11 government Ministers. The day-to day 
management and coordination of emergency relief operations remained with the National 
Executive Commission for the Emergency (CENE), and to coordinate its emergency 
programme on a regular basis within Government as well as with the donor 
organizations. The previously established Department for the Prevention and Combat of 
Natural Disasters (DPCCN) assumed major responsibility for the transport and 
distribution of food aid and relief items to the affected population.325 
The Council of Ministers had charged the Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces 
with the responsibility of ensuring overall coordination for the safe passage of goods to 
the needy popUlation in the rural areas. Measures taken in defence sphere included the 
secondment of two General Staff Officers with the responsibility of monitoring the 
security operations. The Government was revising customs procedures and levies in order 
to speed up the reception and of emergency goods.326 
In 1987 an ambitious structural adjustment programme, known as the economic 
rehabilitation programme, was also launched by government, focusing on macro-
economic policy reforms (exchange rates, trade policies, pricing policies, budget credit) 
the country's earlier economic decline was reversed and a 4 per cent growth in Gross 
National Product (GNP) was recorded in 1988.327 In 1988-1989, the Second Emergence 
Appeal for Assistance to Mozambique, launched at Maputo, adopted a programme which 
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included essential rehabilitation as well as emergency requirements, as it had become 
increasingly evident that some rehabilitative support was required to provide minimum 
assistance to the displaced and severely affected populations.328 Related rehabilitation 
inputs in the fields of agriculture, water, health and education were therefore included to 
the requirements for food aid, relief and survival items and logistics.329 
The emergency programme for 1990-1991 thus gave primary emphasis to direct 
humanitarian assistance for 1.4 million out of an estimated 1.9 million accessible 
displaced persons in the country, as well as the country's 154,000 externally displaced 
persons.330 The programme concentrated on the provision of free food, relief and survival 
items and logistic support to deliver this assistance. 
Consistent with the government's new policy market food aid was no longer included in 
the Emergency Appeal. However, emergency health care, supplementary feeding for 
children, the distribution of seeds and tools to displaced families, the improvement of 
basic water supply and the provision of essential school facilities serving large 
concentrations of displaced persons, as well as a small number of emergency 
rehabilitation activities linked to the immediate requirements of the displaced population, 
remained in the Emergency Programme.331 
The Emergency Programme for 1992/93 included some million people displaced by 
contlict who were scheduled to receive free food assistance. The severity of the drought 
and the scale of crop losses was such that to prevent mass starvation, the numbers of 
Mozambicans who needed to receive free food had risen steeply. The number of affected 
population by drought of 1992/93 in Southern Mozambique was; Maputo 100,000; Gaza 
275,000 and Inhambane 160,000.332 
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Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane indicated that the water supply situation was more grave 
than other parts of the country. In these provinces there were people drinking visibly 
contaminated water from drainage ditches. The water supply problems were also 
compounded by hand pumps breaking down and by the armed conflict. Widespread 
insecurity restricted the area to which people could go to collect water, putting excessive 
pressure on accessible water source. Livestock were also suffering from the acute lack of 
water.333 
The National Rural Water Supply Programme (PRONAR), working with United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) had defined a two-phase strategy for mitigating the worst 
effects of drought on rural water supply. Phase I of the water programme aimed at 
maximising the already existing capacity within PRONAR in order to construct new 
water source in selected districts of Inhambame, Gaza and Maputo provinces.334 It also 
contemplated financing for the recuperation and deepening of the existing shallow well, 
and the installation of hand pumps for all new and recuperated sources and for those 
existing sources with broken hand pumps. 
Having guaranteed the full utilization of existing PRONAR capacity in Phase I, the 
second phase enable that capacity to be increased by providing capital inputs for the 
construction of deep boreholes in the short to medium term. In the urban and peri-urban 
areas, given the falling ground water levels and drastically reduced river flows, water 
supplies to urban areas were becoming increasingly precarious both in terms of quantity 
and quality. This came at a time when popUlation pressure on urban centres because of 
continuing insecurity and drought, was greater than ever before.335 
The National Water Department, Direcryiio Nacional de Aguas (DNA), had agreed on an 
emergency strategy to cope with the effects of drought on urban and peri-urban 
population. Peri-urban areas: I) relieve pressure on water supply systems by construction 
of additional sources and recuperation of existing ones; ii) repair of hand pumps and 












installation of additional pumps in peri-urban areas; iii) involvement of NGOs, the 
communities and a part of the Rural Water Workshop capacity in the construction and 
deepening of wells in peripheral suburbs of towns and cities; iv) and maximize the use of 
existing well supplies by installing small piped water systems kits (tanks, pumps and 
standpipes).336 Urban areas: a) construction of alternative dykes and barrages for water 
storage and for protection against the inflow of saline river water into city water supplies; 
b) drilling of additional brothels equipped with motor pumps and connected to water 
storage deposits in order to reinforce urban water supplies; c) and undertake emergency 
waterworks in catchments areas to secure regular supplies for cities and towns.337 
Even before the drought of 1992/3, malnutrition was a cause for concern of the health 
authorities. More than 90 per cent ofthe nutritional surveys carried out in 1991 indicated 
high rates of severe malnutrition. The rate of low birth weight among new-born babies 
was 15 per cent. Therapeutic feeding for acutely malnourished children was provided by 
a mixture of milk, oil and sugar.338 The therapeutic feeding programme were carried out 
by Ministry of Health in hospitals and health centres. Several international and national 
NGOs had also set up therapeutic feeding programmes.339 
With the onset of the drought, assessments were being done to determine the expanded 
needs in the most affected areas. The depletion of water reserves had also contributed to 
the deterioration of public hygiene and the spread of disease. The health authorities had 
stressed that the drought conditions were likely to cause increases in various diseases, 
notably diarrhea, cholera, bubonic plague, meningitis, malaria and conjunctivitis. 340 
Supplies of oral dehydration salts were essential for the treatment of severe diarrheas 
diseases. Supplies of soap were likewise important, since the lack of soap was linked 
directly with the transmission of many diseases.341 
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The last outbreaks of bubonic plague in Southern Mozambique occurred in 1976 and 
1978 under similar drought and famine conditions. Cases of meningitis tented to be more 
frequent under dry conditions, occurring mainly in Gaza and Maputo city. Malaria had 
been extremely virulent, with an increase in chloroquin-resistent cases.342 It was feared 
that drought conditions could force concentrations of people around water sources that 
could be breeding grounds for mosquitoes, thus increasing the incidence of malaria. The 
general deterioration of the state of health of the popUlation left children in particular 
vulnerable to infections of various sorts, while poor public hygiene served to increase the 
ri sk. 343 
Therefore, the epidemics were aggravated by the constant population movements, 
overcrowding in accommodation centres and urban areas, poor sanitary conditions and 
lack of access to clean water. Such conditions, which were compounded by the 
difficulties of maintaining a functioning cold chain and carrying out vaccination 
programmes in a conflict situation, also favour measles, outbreaks. Other major causes of 
illness and death were acute respiratory infections. The number of known AIDS suffers 
remained relatively low.344 So influence of local environmental circumstances and of the 
role key factors of water supply, sanitation, fuel and cultivation environmental health 
issues were considered for different locales in Southern Mozambique. 
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The chapter of introduction begins with a review of the general problems of the impact of 
the armed conflict in Mozambique, examining the degree of the problems of 
environmental stress and economic situation in Southern Mozambique, in particular with 
regard to migrant labour situation, character of armed conflict and the environmental 
profile on the effects of conflict. In this chapter of introduction I tried to present and 
explain that the conflict in Southern Mozambique demonstrated that war and 
environmental protection were incompatible. However, environmental damage was not 
limited to episodes of armed conflict, but was implicit in militarisation, the process 
whereby resources were mobilised for war. Military activities, even in peacetime, affect 
the environment. In Mozambique, such activities included training and exercises in parks 
and reserves, the establishment of military bases and installations in unsuitable places. 
Furthermore, military activities consumed resources urgently needed for economic 
development and environmental protection. 
The second chapter describes the interaction that existed between agricultural economy 
and migrant labour, years after independence up to signature of the General Peace Accord 
Agreement on 4 October 1992 between FRELIMO and RENAMO in Rome bringing an 
end of the armed conflict in Mozambique. When the accord was signed in Rome had 
triggered an immediate invitation from the government of the Mozambique to United 
Nations to undertake a comprehensive peacekeeping operation that would guide the 
country from armed conflict to democratic and peaceful elections.345 Still this chapter 
analyses the impact of the expulsion of Mozambican migrant workers from South Africa 
in the Mozambican economy. Because when South African government decided 
unilaterally, in 1986, the repatriation of Mozambicans employed on South African mines 
and farms, Mozambique faced immediately the following problems: unemployment, the 
345Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, p.23; and Vines, Renamo: 











reduction of goods and services in local trades circuits and a sharp loss in foreign 
exchange earnings.346 The section also analyses the interaction between FRELIMO's 
project of socialist transformation, through the development of agricultural cooperatives 
and state farms. 
In the chapter three I explain the character of armed conflict and its phases. I also explain 
that the war generated two particular problems one of which was the rapid process of 
urbanization and the other was a fast increase in the pressure on the resources of the 
littoral zones and transport corridors. The war had determined that the littoral was a main 
area of productive activity. The coastal environment offered a unique and fertile 
combination of flora, fauna, forest and fish.347 
And throughout the chapter four I have examined the impact of the armed conflict in the 
countryside, urban and peri-urban areas. I have also discussed the problematic of 
environmental impact in an armed conflict context and other environmental problems 
which were provoked by the rural communities, to deal with war trauma and socio-
economic disorders. 
Considering that the majority of the population affected by the war were peasants who 
desperately needed to reorganize their lives, this chapter has suggested that the conflict 
should not be antagonized as has happened in the past but rather accelerated 
environmental problems. 
346Intemational Migration for Employment, pp.l 0-11; and Darch, A Guerra e as 
mudancas sociais em Mocambique(1986-1992), p.218. 
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